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Introduction
The public key cryptosystems play an important role in digital communications. Several
public key cryptosystems were proposed in the past, among them the RSA (acronym of
the surnames of the authors) by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman in 1977
and the ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) proposed independently by Victor Miller and
Neal Koblitz around 1985. These last two cryptosystems are actually the most popular,
even if over the years ECC increased its popularity. Some factors that made the ECC more
attractive than RSA are:
 existence of subexponential algorithm (some of them based on elliptic curves) to solve
the integer factorization problem on which rely the RSA
 more exibility in the choice of the parameters for the ECC
 a computationally ecient arithmetic on elliptic curves that allows implementations
also for devices with low computational power.
This thesis continue and expands the work presented previously in the master thesis [25]
and in the articles [22] and [23]. It is focused on improving some tools commonly used for
cryptanalytical applications on elliptic curves, and some of them can be applied also when
performing modular arithmetic in a more general context than the cryptological one.
1
2In chapter 1 it is given an introduction to the NVidia CUDA programming model and
described some problems that can appear while writing code that must run on graphic
processing units.
In chapter 2 it is described a full implementation for single-instruction multiple-data
architectures of a fast modular arithmetic library, with emphasis on the modular inversion.
It is presented a variant of the Stein's algorithm that reduces divergence among thread and
allows to consider it as a good alternative (for suciently big prime elds) to the branch-free
algorithm based on Euler-Fermat theorem.
In chapter 3 it is discussed the Rho-Pollard implementation for single-instruction multiple-
data architectures that uses the negation maps. It is presented also a variant of the classical
iterating function of the Rho-Pollard algorithm to reduce the overhead to check for fruitless
cycles.
Chapter 4 contains the description of an experimental work performed on SAGE and
aimed to apply the Smart's attack on anomalous elliptic curves (dened on prime elds) to a
curve dened over a ring Zn1n2 with n1n2 points. To realize these experiments, the author,
implemented into SAGE a complete system of addition laws for elliptic curves over rings,
and the functions to perform arithmetic on polyadic numbers.
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Chapter 1
High performance computing on graphic
processing units
Due to the increasing request from the market of realtime, high-denition 3D graphics, in re-
cent years Graphic Processor Units (GPUs) have evolved into higly parallel, multithreaded,
multicore processors with an extremely high computational power and very high bandwidth
as can be clearly seen from the next gures.
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Typical problems where the GPUs are well suited are the ones that can be expressed as
data-parallel (where the same program is executed on many data elements in parallel), as, for
example, in graphic rendering, where the computation of the whole scene can be performed
applying the same algorithm to smaller portions of the scene itself.
Anyway, data parallel problems are not restricted to image rendering eld, in fact there
are many algorithms that take advantage from the data-parallel processing from very dier-
ent elds: signal processing, physics simulation, computational nance and computational
biology.
1.1 CUDA
CUDA is the acronym of Compute Unied Device Architecture. It is the programming
model created by NVIDIA and implemented on their GPUs. This programming model
allows developers to access GPUs and the memory on video cards for generic computations
like common CPUs. This approach to solve generic problems on GPUs is called General-
Purpose computing on Graphic Processing Units (GPGPU). CUDA platforms can
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be programmed through CUDA accelerated libraries available as extensions for industry-
standard languages like C/C++ and Fortran or through third-party wrappers for Python,
Perl, Java, Ruby, Matlab and Mathematica.
1.1.1 The CUDA data parallel threading model
The core of the parallel programming model of CUDA are three main abstractions:
 a hierarchy of thread groups
 shared memories
 barrier syncronization.
These abstractions are available to the programmer through a minimal set of language
extensions and provide an ecient way to nely handle:
 problems that can be split into subproblems that can be solved indipendently in
parallel by blocks of threads
 subproblems that can be furtherly split into smaller pieces that can be solved coop-
erately by all threads within a block.
This hierarchy of threads allows automatic scalability on dierent GPUs: each block of
threads can be scheduled on any of the Streaming Multiprocessors (SMs) available on a
GPU in any order (sequentially or concurrently) so a CUDA program can execute on GPUs
with any number of SM and only the runtime system needs to know the physical number of
multiprocessors available.
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In CUDA C the programmer denes C functions called kernels that, when called, are
executed N times in parallel by N dierent CUDA threads.
A kernel is dened with the__global__ declaration specier and the number of CUDA
threads that execute that kernel is specied within the brackets <<<...>>> between the
name of the kernel and the list of arguments in a kernel call.
Each thread has a unique thread ID that is accessible within the thread itself through a
threadIdx variable.
As example, in the following code (taken from [24]):
// Kernel d e f i n i t i o n
__global__ void VecAdd( f loat  A, f loat  B, f loat  C)
{
int i = threadIdx . x ;
C[ i ] = A[ i ] + B[ i ] ;
}
int main ( ) {
. . .
// Kernel invoca t i on wi th N threads
VecAdd<<<1, N>>>(A, B, C) ;
. . .
}
are instantiated N threads, each of them executing VecAdd().
1.1.2 Thread hierarchy and syncronization
Threads are grouped into blocks.
Since all the theads into a block are expected to reside on the same processor core and
share the limited memory resources of that core, there is a maximum number of threads per
block that actually is 1024. Anyway a kernel can be executed by multiple blocks of threads,
grouped into a logical structure called grid.
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Threads (resp. blocks) can be organized into a one, two or three dimensional block (resp.
grid).
Blocks of threads must run independently, in this way they can be scheduled on the
available SMs in parallel or in series.
Threads are executed in groups of 32 for each streaming multiprocessor. A group of
threads is called Warp.
Each SM loads a single instruction at time and execute it on all threads running on it,
this means that inside a warp each thread do the same thing at the same time.
Threads within a block on the other hand, can cooperate and share some informations
through some shared memory and synchronize their execution to coordinate memory ac-
cesses. The function__syncthreads() is used (as the name suggests) to syncronize threads
within a block, and acts as a barrier that all thread into a warp must reach before any of
them is allowed to continue.
1.1.3 Memory hierarchy
CUDA oers multiple memory spaces to threads, each of them with their own charateristics:
 each thread has access to a private local memory,
 each thread into a block has access to a shared memory with the same lifetime of
the block,
 all threads have access to the same global memory,
 two additional read-only memory spaces are available to all threads: the constant
and the texture memory spaces.
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The global, constant and texture memory spaces are persistent across kernel launches by
the same application.
1.1.4 Memory access
The access to data in the global memory space is a critical factor for the performances of a
CUDA application.
Global memory is implemented with dynamical random access memories (DRAM) and
the read of it is a very slow process.
Modern DRAMs use a parallel process and each time a memory location is requested,
many consecutive locations are read at the same time including the requested one.
Since all thread into a warp execute the same instruction, maximum performances are
achieved when all threads into a warp have to read the same location or a group of consecutive
locations. When this conditions are met the hardware try to coalesce multiple reading
requests into a single one. NVidia GPUs can coalesce accesses to 8-bit words into a request
for 32Byte, 16-bit words into 64Byte, and for 32-bit and 64-bit words 128Byte, if needed it
can be issued a smaller request to avoid the waste of bandwidth due to unused words.
Figure 1.1 shows two dierent ways to store the elements of n vectors of length m that
lead to an uncoalesced memory access (a) and a coalesced memory access (b). Element i
of vector j is denoted by vij. Each thread in the GPU kernel is assigned to one m-length
vector. Threads in CUDA are grouped in an array of blocks and every thread in GPU has a
unique id which can be dened as indx = bd bx+ tx, where bd represents block dimension,
bx denotes the block index and tx is the thread index in each block. Let's suppose that
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Figure 1.1: Uncoalesced memory access (a) Vs Coalesced memory access (b)
each thread, in parallel, accesses to the rst element of its own vector. In the rst case (a)
with a linear memorization of the vectors, we need to access to addresses 0;m; 2m; : : : of the
memory (pointed by arrows). These locations are not consecutive, so the reading requests
will read also locations contiguous to the needed ones leading to a waste of bandwidth due
to the loading of unused words. If, on the other hand, these elements (rst elements of each
vector) are packed together like in (b), all of them can be loaded with fewer reading requests
and the wasted bandwidth will be much lower (hopefully will be zero). Since the allowed
size of residing threads per GPU block is limited to bd, a coalesced data arrangement can be
nicely achieved storing the rst elements of the rst bd vectors in consecutive order, followed
by the second elements of the rst bd vectors and so on, and starting again with the second
db vectors that will be stored in a similar way like shown in gure 1.1 (b). In the linear
data storage (a), the component i (0  i < m) of vector indx (0  indx < n) is addressed
by m  indx + i; the same component in the coalesced storage pattern (b) is addressed as
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(m bd)ixC + bd ixB + ixA = bx, where ixC = floor[(m indx+ i)=(m bd)], ixB = i
and ixA = mod(indx; bd) = tx. In the coalesced memory storage the access to the elements
of the vectors is a little tricky, but leads to a signicant higher memory bandwidth of GPU
global memory.
1.1.5 Thread divergence
Since each SM loads a single instruction and execute it on all threads running on it, it means
that inside a warp each thread do the same thing at the same time.
This lead us to the main cause of performance loss when executing code on GPUs: the
presence of the so-called "divergent threads".
The divergence of a thread (or a subset of threads) happens when it needs to execute an
instruction dierent from other threads of the warp.
Let's suppose that we want to execute a simple piece of code like this:
. . .
i f (x<0.0)
{
z=x 2.0;
}
else
{
z=sq r t ( x ) ;
}
. . .
if the x variable is dierent in various threads, the compiler can't decide if the whole
if-else statement can be optimized discarding one branch or the other one, so, through the
so called "predicated instructions" mechanism, it is associated a predicate to the condition
of the if statement and each instruction of the statement is executed.
1.1. CUDA 12
. . .
p = (x<0.0) ;
i f (p) z = x 2.0;
i f ( ! p ) z = sq r t ( x ) ;
. . .
It will be chosen then the correct value of z according the predicate that is true or false.
Chapter 2
Modular arithmetic for multiword
integers on GPU
One of the key factors for an ecient implementation of cryptographic primitives or crypt-
analytical attacks is an ecient modular arithmetic. On GPUs one can take advantage of
the huge processing power available, unfortunately some factors must be taken into account
to not waste such a huge power. For the memory accesses, one can adopt some memorization
patterns that allow coalesced accesses. For the divergence of threads all algorithms must be
evalued carefully to reduce such divergence to the minimum, or completely avoid if possible.
In this chapter we describe our implementation of basic modular multiword arithmetic and
show a modied algorithm for modular inversion, derived by the Stein's algorithm, that per-
forms better than the Euler-Fermat modular exponentiation (widely adopted since it can be
implemented without divergenace) on prime elds that have a characteristic with a binary
representation greater than ~500 bits.
13
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2.1 Addition, subtraction and product
For our implementation we used a radix-32 representation of unsigned integers1 stored into
C arrays following patterns that grant coalesced memory accesses for reading and writing
into global memory by all threads.
These patterns will not be considered in the description of the algorithms, so in our
pseudocode an integer A in radix-32 representation that needs Maxlength =

logA
32

words,
is stored into an array A[Maxlength] = a[0]; a[1]; :::; a[Maxlength   1] where a[0] contains
the less signicant bits.
In the description of our algorithms P will always be the modulus, A and B will always
be the operands, Maxlength is the size in number of words of P .
2.1.1 Addition and subtraction
Sum and dierence modulo P are performed in a similar trivial way.
Both use two temporary arrays named Result0 and Result1 of size Maxlength to store
intermediate computations and two integers carry and borrow initially set to 0.
For addition, given A,B < P; we perform a cycle of length Maxlength where for
each couple of words a[i] and b[i] we store2 (carry; result1[i]) = a[i] + b[i] + carry and
in (borrow; result0[i]) = result1[i]  p[i]  borrow.
In a similar way it is performed subtraction modulo P .
In both algorithms, once the For cycle ends we return the array resultborrow[] ofMaxlength
words that contains the correct result.
1we worked on a NVidia's gpu of the FERMI family, where single word 32-bit multiplication is natively
supported and is more ecient than 24-bit multiplication that was natively supported on previous architec-
tures by NVidia.
2Carry and borrow generated by single word operands can be computed using a temporary 64-bit word.
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Algorithm: Addition(P;A;B)
input : A prime P and integers A;B 2 FP
output: A+B mod P
1 carry  0;
2 borrow  0;
3 result0[Maxlength] 0;
4 result1[Maxlength] 0;
5 for i 0 to Maxlength  1 do
6 (carry; result1[i]) a[i] + b[i] + carry;
7 (borrow; result0[i]) result0[i]  p[i]  borrow;
8 end
9 return resultborrow[];
Algorithm 1: Addition
Algorithm: Subtraction(P;A;B)
input : A prime P and integers A;B 2 FP
output: A B mod P
1 carry  0;
2 borrow  0;
3 result0[Maxlength] 0;
4 result1[Maxlength] 0;
5 for i 0 to Maxlength  1 do
6 (borrow; result0[i]) a[i]  b[i]  borrow;
7 (carry; result1[i]) result0[i] + p[i] + carry;
8 end
9 return resultborrow[];
Algorithm 2: Subtraction
2.1.2 Product
We considered the standard Montgomery product.
Following values (that can be precomputed) are needed:
 R = 2Maxlength32(modP )
 R 1 and P 0 are the integers for which RR 1   PP 0 = 1 (they can be easily computed
through the Extended Euclidean Algorithm)
Into the arrays R[]; R 1[] and P 0[] (with size Maxlength) we store their representation
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radix-32 mod P
We call A the Montgomery representation of the integer A dened as A = AR(mod P )
while Montgomery product is dened as
ABR 1(modP ) = (AR)(BR)R 1(modP ) = ABR(modP ) = AB(mod P ).
As pointed out in [10] the most ecient implementation of this product is the one that
uses the (so called) Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning approach.
Algorithm: MonPro(P;A;B; p0[0])
input : A prime P , integers A;B 2 FP and value p0[0]
output: The Montgomery product of A and B
1 carry  0; sum 0;
2 result[Maxlength+ 2];
3 for i 0 to Maxlength  1 do
4 carry  0;
5 for j  0 to Maxlength  1 do
6 (carry; sum) result[j] + a[j]  b[i] + carry;
7 result[j] sum;
8 end
9 (carry; sum) result[Maxlength] + carry;
10 result[Maxlength] sum;
11 result[Maxlength+ 1] carry;
12 carry  0;
13 m result[0]  p0[0]mod 232;
14 (carry; sum) result[0] +m  p[0];
15 for j  1 to Maxlength  1 do
16 (carry; sum) result[j] +m  p[j] + carry;
17 result[j   1] sum;
18 (carry; sum) result[Maxlength] + carry;
19 result[Maxlength  1] sum;
20 result[Maxlength] result[Maxlength+ 1] + carry;
21 result[] Normalize(result[],p[]);
22 end
23 end
24 return result[];
Algorithm 3: Montgomery product (CIOS)
From the relation RR 1 PP 0 = 1 we have PP 0 =  1 (Mod R) =  1 (Mod 232Maxlength)
and p[0]p0[0] =  1 (Mod 232): This relation is used into lines from 15 to 22 to compute
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result := result+result[0]p0[0]p[] equivalent to the partial product modulo P (potentially
bigger than R) but with last 32 bit all set to zero (so it can be right shifted without any
information loss). A minor improvement can be obtained in CUDA substituting line 12
(where is performed a full 32-bit product and then an addition with carry propagation) with
this line:
1 carry  __umulhi(m; p[0]) + (result[0]?1 : 0);
where we just compute higher half of the product mp[0] with the function __umulhi()
since we know that the lower half will be 0 when we will add result[0], and this last addition
will generate a carry every time result[0] will be dierent from 0 (from which result[0]?1 : 0).
Into line 21 it is called functionNormalize that takes in input result[] of sizeMaxlength+
1 containing the product 0  AB < 2P and (similarly to the subtraction) computes AB
(Mod P ).
Algorithm: Normalize(P;A)
input : A prime P and an integer 0  A < 2P
output: AmodP
1 carry  0;
2 borrow  0;
3 temp 0;
4 result0[Maxlength] 0;
5 result1[Maxlength] 0;
6 for i 0 to Maxlength  1 do
7 (borrow; result0[i]) a[i]  p[i];
8 result1[i] a[i];
9 end
10 (borrow; temp) a[Maxlength]  borrow;
11 return resultborrow[];
Algorithm 4: Auxiliary function for the Montgomery Product
To convert an integer A into its Montgomery representation, we can use MonPro with
R2 in input as second operand, infact AR2R 1(ModP ) = AR(ModP ) = A. While to convert
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A back into its "standard" representation we can call MonPro with 1 as second operand.
2.2 Modular inversion
2.2.1 Euler-Fermat
Modular inverse can be computed applying the Euler-Fermat theorem. Working in the FP
eld we have3 8a 2 FP ; a'(P )  aP 1  1(Mod P ) from which aP 2  a 1(Mod P ).
This exponentiation can be computed withO(logP )Montgomery multiplications through
a square-and-multiply approach.
Algorithm: EulerFermatInversion(P;A)
input : A prime P and an integer A 2 FP
output: A 1modP
1 Ptemp[] P []  2;
2 A[] MonPro(A;R2; P;Maxlength; P 0[0]);
3 t[] A[];
4 mask  2blogPtempc;
5 for i 0 to blogPtempc do
6 currentbit Ptemp[] & mask;
7 t[] MonPro(t; t; P;Maxlength; P 0[0]);
8 if (currentbit == 1) then
9 t[] MonPro(t; A; P;Maxlength; P 0[0]);
10 end
11 mask  ShiftRight(mask; 1);
12 end
13 t[] MonPro(t; 1; P;Maxlength; P 0[0]);
14 return t[];
Algorithm 5: Inversion through the Euler-Fermat theorem
It is the most used method when computing the inverse on SIMD architectures, indeed,
once the modulus is xed, the algorithm follow the same control ow whatever is the integer
A 2 FP in input.
3'(n) is the Euler's totient function that gives the number of integers less than n that are coprime with
n
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Since each Montgomery multiplication has a complexity of O(log2 P ) and the total num-
ber of multiplication is proportional to logP the algorithm has a cubic complexity.
The worst case is when the prime P is in the form 2k+1, since the binary representation
of P   2 is a sequence of all ones.
2.2.2 "Sloppy reduction"
Recently, Bos et al. [6] have proposed a really fast reduction algorithm that exploits the
redundant representation of the modulus.
In the resolution of the ECDLP problem over the prime eld of 112 bits it appeared
that the modulus P = 2
128 3
116949 . They decided to use the reduction modulo
~P = 2128   3 to
perform all the computations and only when needed to check for distinguishing property or
partitioning, they switched back to the modulo P representation.
Performing reductions modulo ~P is extremely fast since x  2128(mod ~P )  3x(mod ~P ).
The algorithm is called "sloppy" since it has a negligible probability to produce an in-
correct result.
For this reason, as stated in the paper, the algorithm is not suitable for cryptographical
application, while it is for cryptanalytical ones.
2.3 Stein's algorithm
The binary gcd (or Stein's algorithm) is a variation of the classical Euclidean algorithm for
the greatest common divisor computation.
It is based on four simple observations:
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 if a; b are both even, then the gcd(a; b) = 2 gcd(a=2; b=2)
 if a is even and b is odd, then gcd(a; b) = gcd(a=2; b)
 gcd(a; b) = gcd(a  b; b)
 if a; b are both odd, then ja  bj is even and less than maxfa; bg
These observations lead to an extremely simple algorithm that uses only multiplications
and divisions by 2 (performed through left and right shifts) and subtractions.
Algorithm: BinaryGCD(A;B)
input : Integers A;B 2 Z
output: The greatest common divisor of A and B
1 u A;
2 v  B;
3 while u  0(mod 2) and v  0(mod 2) do
4 u u=2;
5 v  v=2;
6 e 2e;
7 end
8 while u 6= 0 do
9 while u  0(mod 2) do
10 u u=2;
11 end
12 while v  0(mod 2) do
13 v  v=2;
14 end
15 if u  v then
16 u u  v;
17 else
18 v  v   u;
19 end
20 end
21 return v  e;
Algorithm 6: Binary GCD
The algorithm has been extensively studied by [17][9][1], its average complexity isO(log2(ab))
with a constant c ' 0:8 while in the worst case scenario [17, (66) p.353, (39) p.653] the al-
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gorithm performs maxfblog ac ; blog bcg+ 1 subtractions and log(ab) shifts as happens with
inputs a = 2n+1   2 and b = 2n+1   1.
Algorithm: ExtBinAlgForInv(P;A)
input : A prime P and an integer A 2 FP
output: A 1modP
1 u A;
2 v  P ;
3 x1  1;
4 x2  0;
5 while u 6= 1 and v 6= 1 do
6 while u  0(mod 2) do
7 u := u=2;
8 if x1  0(mod 2) then
9 x1  x1=2;
10 else
11 x1  (x1 + P )=2;
12 end
13 end
14 while v  0(mod 2) do
15 v  v=2;
16 if x2  0(mod 2) then
17 x2  x2=2;
18 else
19 x2  (x2 + P )=2;
20 end
21 end
22 if u  v then
23 u u  v;
24 x1  x1   x2;
25 else
26 v  v   u;
27 x2  x2   x1;
28 end
29 end
30 if u == 1 then
31 return (x1modP );
32 else
33 return (x2modP );
34 end
Algorithm 7: Modular inversion through the Extended Binary GCD
Like the "classical" Euclidean algorithm, also the binary algorithm has an "extended"
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version that computes also the so called Bézout coecient x and y of the equation ax+ by =
gcd(a; b).
Working in a eld FP we know that 8a 2 FP ; gcd(a; P ) = 1(modP ), we can use this infor-
mation to compute a 1(modP ): In fact from the Bézout's equation ax+ Py = gcd(a; P ) =
1(modP ) from which ax  1  yP (modP )  1(modP ), and x = a 1(modP ).
This version of the algorithm sadly is not suitable for SIMD architectures since, once
xed the modulus, it follows a dierent control ow according the binary representation of
the given integer to invert.
A trivial observation is that we can obtain an algorithm that follows a unique control
ow regardless of the integer to invert, if we always perform the maximum number of loops
of the main while cycle and for each loop a subtraction.
Of course the subtraction is not needed if we have u or v even, in that case the result of
the subtraction is discarded, if a subtraction is needed when the shift function is called, it
is called with 0 as number of bits that the operand must be shifted.
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The Algorithm 8 is an implementation on SIMD architectures for multiword integers:
Algorithm: SIMDExtBinAlgForInv(P;A)
input : A prime P and an integer A 2 FP
output: A 1modP
1 A0[] P ;
2 A1[] A;
3 B0[] 0;
4 B1[] 1;
5 temp[] 0;
6 t 0;
7 greater  1;
8 newgreater  0;
9 parityA  0;
10 parityB  0;
11 targetdifference; result;
12 targetdifference temp;
13 result temp;
14 for j  0 to 2  dlogP e+ 1 do
15 targetdifference[] temp[];
16 result[] (Bgreater[] B(1 greater)[])modP ;
17 t Agreater[0]&1;
18 Agreater[] ShiftRight(Agreater[]; 1  t);
19 parityB  Bgreater[0]&1;
20 parityB  t?0 : parityB;;
21 AddModulus(Bgreater; Bgreater; P; parityB);
22 Bgreater[] ShiftRight(Bgreater[]; (1  t));
23 parityA  Agreater[0]&1;
24 newgreater  GreaterThan(temp;A0; A1; P );
25 greater  parityA?newgreater : greater;
26 targetdifference parityA?Agreater : temp;
27 result parityA?Bgreater : temp;
28 result (newgreater 6= 2)?result : temp;
29 targetdifference (newgreater 6= 2)?targetdifference : A1;
30 greater  (newgreater 6= 2)?greater : 1;
31 end
32 return B1[];
Algorithm 8: Modular inversion through the Extended Binary GCD on SIMD
architecture
This algorithm uses some additional functions:
 function GreaterThan takes 4 integers as input Result; A;B; P (respectively: the
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destination of the result, the two integers that must be compared and the modulus),
writes into Result = jA BjmodP and returns 0; 1 o 2 if A > B;A < B o A = B
 function AddModulus takes in input integers Result; A and P and a boolean value
parity, and returns Result = A if parity is 0 otherwise Result = A+ P if parity is 1.
 function4 ShiftRight takes in input two integers A(in multiword representation or not)
and t, and performs a right shift of the array of bits that represents A of t positions
to the right.
It is important to note that each branch do not cause divergence since it is translated by
the compiler into a single "compare" instruction.
2.3.1 A "reduced divergence" version of the Stein's algorithm
When one of the operands in Stein's algorithm is even, one bit is removed performing a right
shift of the operand itself for each iteration of the inner while cycle. Since for multiword
integer the shift operation is costly and takes the same time if we perform a shift of one or
more bits (since it must be shifted the whole array where the operand is stored), it would
be nice to remove as many zeroes as possible in the same iteraction of the main while cycle.
Instead of performing a loop to detect the number of "trailing zeros" of an operand, a
well known trick can be used.
Obtaining the number of zeroes in the least signicant position of a non zero integer A
is clearly equivalent to obtain the position of the rst bit set to 1 starting from the least
signicant positions of its binary representation.
4The function ShiftLeft that will be used in the following algorithms operates in a similar way performing
a left shift
2.3. STEIN'S ALGORITHM 25
Let's consider a one word integer A. First we need to isolate the least signicant bit
of the integer A. We can do that easily in two's complement representation computing the
value X = A&( A) in this way we obtain a binary string X that contains a one in the
position of the least signcant bit set (if there's one) of the word A.
After that we can obtain the number of trailing zeroes of X (and of course of A) with
the help of De Bruijn's sequences [21].
A De Bruijn's sequence of length n = 2k is a cyclic sequence of 0 and 1 where it's
possible to nd exactly once, as substring, every sequence of length log n = k . An example
of length 8 is 00011101. In this string can be recognized as substrings (from left to right)
000; 001; 011; 111; 110; 101 and, if we wrap around the string, 010, 100.
These sequences have the amazing property that multiplied with a string Y of the same
length with just one bit set, they return a new string where the most signicant k = log n
bits contains a dierent value for each string of length n that contains just one bit set. In
this way the most signicant k bits can be used as a hash value to obtain the number of
trailing bits of Y .
So if we have a 32 bits integer A, at rst we compute B = A& A, then we multiply by the
corresponding De Bruijn sequence of 32 bit that is the hexadecimal string 077CB531 (or in
binary 00000111011111001011010100110001), then we do a right shift of 27 bits (32  log 32),
now we have a value in the interval [0; 31] that can be used as index into an array of 32
elements to obtain the position of the rst bit set to 1 in the string B (that is the same
position of the rst non zero bit of the string A).
Into line 3 it is returned value 32 if the unsinged integer in input is zero (infact A = 0
and A  1mod 2 generate same output after the multiplication by the De Bruijn sequence),
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Algorithm: LeastSignicantBit(A)
input : An unsigned (one word) integer A
output: The number of bits set to zero before the rst set to one starting from
the least signicant bit of the integer A. The function return 32 if A = 0
1 MultiplyDeBruijnBitPosition[32] f0; 1; 28; 2; 29; 14; 24; 3; 30; 22;
20; 15; 25; 17; 4; 8; 31; 27; 13; 23; 21; 19; 16; 7; 26; 12; 18; 6; 11; 5; 10; 9g;
2 r  MultiplyDeBruijnBitPosition[ShiftRight(((A& A)0x077CB531U); 27)];
3 return A?r : 32;
Algorithm 9: Function LeastSignicantBit
in this way we can give in input to the function LeastSignificantBit every 32bits value,
without any ambiguity.
With this function we can implement a "new" version of the Stein's algorithm for multi-
word integers (Algorithm 10) that removes up to 32bits from one of the two operands (if it
is even) within a single iteraction of the while loop.
The function PowerOfTwoDiv performs a division of the (multiword) integer taken in
input by a power of 2 up to 232. In this function the value p0[0] is used in a similar way to
what has been done for the Montgomery multiplication algorithm for intermediate products.
This version of the Stein's algorithm performs the same operations on all threads until
the condition of the while loop isn't false. When the condition of the while loop is false
it calls the function __syncthreads() that puts the thread into a "waiting state" until all
other threads in the same block have reached their __syncthreads() call. The worst case of
the DeBruijnBinaryInversion algorithm is (of course) still linked to the worst case of the
Stein's algorithm and happens (for example) when the modulus is in the form of 2n+1 1 and
the integer to invert is in the form 2n . In that case the algorithm performs n+Maxlength
iterations of the while loop (one for each shift+subtraction and one for each shift followed
by another shift).
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Algorithm: DeBruijnBinaryInversion(P;A)
input : A prime P and an integer A 2 FP
output: A 1modP
1 A0[] P ;
2 A1[] A;
3 B0[] 0;
4 B1[] 1;
5 temp[] 0;
6 t 0;
7 greater  1;
8 newgreater  0;
9 parity  0;
10 targetdifference; result;
11 targetdifference temp;
12 result temp;
13 while greater < 2 do
14 targetdifference[] temp[];
15 result[] (Bgreater[] B(1 greater)[])modP ;
16 t LeastSignificantBit(Agreater[0]);
17 Agreater[] ShiftRight(Agreater[]; t);
18 PowerOfTwoDiv(Bgreater; t; P; P
0[0]);
19 parity  Agreater[0]&1;
20 newgreater  GreaterThan(temp;A0; A1; P );
21 greater  parity?newgreater : greater;
22 targetdifference parity?Agreater : temp;
23 result parity?Bgreater : temp;
24 end
25 __syncthreads();
26 return B1;
Algorithm 10: Modular inversion through the Extended Binary GCD (using De
Bruijn sequences and Montgomery arithmetic) on SIMD architecture
The algorithm can be easily modied to operate without synchronization, performing
always the maximum number of cycles of the main loop, with a little overhead to save the
correct result. This can be useful for cryptographic purposes as countermeasure to side
channel attacks.
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Algorithm: PowerOfTwoDiv
input : A prime P and an integer A 2 FP
output: A=2tmodP
1 carry  0;
2 m (A[0]  P 0[0])&(2t   1);
3 (MulHi;MulLow) m  P [0];
4 (carry; sum) MulLow + A[0];
5 A[0] sum;
6 carry  MulHi+ carry;
7 for i 1 to Maxlength do
8 (MulHi;MulLow) m  P [i];
9 (carry; sum) carry + A[i] +MulLow;
10 A[i] sum;
11 carry  carry +MulHi;
12 end
13 A[] ShiftRight(A[]; t);
14 A[Maxlength  1] A[Maxlength  1] + (ShiftLeft(carry; 32  t));
15 A[] (A[]  P [])modP ;
16 return A[];
Algorithm 11: Division modulo P of an integer A by 2
2.3.2 Test of Modular inversion algorithms on CUDA
In this section we examine performances of the various modular inversion algorithms pre-
sented (except "sloppy reduction").
Each test was performed on a prime eld loading a batch of integers belonging to it. To
test the algorithms, we choose the prime elds where are dened some of the problems of
the CERTICOM ECC Challenge[11], with bit sizes from 79 bits to 359 bits, and, together
with them, we tested the algorithms also on two prime elds with characteristic 2521  1 and
2607  1 (the 13th and 14th Mersenne prime) to have the worst case of the algorithms based
on Binary GCD.
For each batch of integers we perform a modular inversion with each of the algorithms
presented earlier. The total amount of integers loaded for each batch is 336 to have one
integer to invert for each shader of the GeForce GTX 460 card used in the tests.
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Each batch is composed of 335 integers randomly choosen (through the mpz_urandomm
function of The GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library) in the interval [0; P   1].
Together with them it is loaded also the integer 2blogP c, in this way the number of subtractions
performed by the binary gcds will never be lower thanH(P ) 1 (whereH(P ) is the Hamming
weight of P). Table 2.1 shows the timings in milliseconds of each kernel launch:
Field H(P ) Algorithm 5 Algorithm 8 Algorithm 10 Algorithm 10*
Fp79: 39 0.252898 1.089207 0.643887 0.734762
Fp97: 46 0.420742 1.868598 1.101820 1.292625
Fp109: 61 0.494477 2.126993 1.207894 1.440418
Fp131: 61 1.058161 3.389219 1.874419 2.300335
Fp163: 84 1.762847 5.194430 2.932256 3.570646
Fp191: 101 2.086245 6.109649 3.417678 4.134653
Fp239: 132 4.271451 10.159895 5.807271 7.128032
Fp359: 165 12.477047 23.607784 13.480877 16.418306
Fp521: 521 64.032623 96.310081 68.006874 72.007965
Fp607: 607 93.859047 128.207870 88.764221 93.967064
Table 2.1:
 Algorithm 5 = Euler-Fermat.
 Algorithm 8 = Inversion through the Binary GCD.
 Algorithm 10 = Binary GCD with De Bruijn sequences and synchronization.
 Algorithm 10* = Binary GCD with De Bruijn sequences without synchronization.
We underline that while the Euler-Fermat method and the Binary GCD as implemented in
the Algorithm 10* (performing the maximum number of iteractions of the main loop) always
take the same time, once xed the modulus regardless the integer to invert, the Binary GCD
as implemented in the Algorithm 8 and Algorithm 10 can be faster than the timings shown
in the table since performances have been tested in one of the worst cases (the worst for
prime elds dened on Mersenne primes).
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Some considerations
In this chapter we presented a generic method that do not exploit any optimization based
on the particular nature of the prime that denes the eld.
The method proposed (unlike the traditional Stein's algorithm) uses also multiplications,
anyway the number of single word multiplications performed is Maxlength + 1 for each
loop of the algorithm (one into the LeastSignificantBit() function and Maxlength into
the PowerOfTwoDiv() function), leading again to a quadratic complexity.
Our method is faster than the Euler-Fermat method for suciently big prime elds. Of
course if we renounce to the generality of the algorithm there are other optimizations that
exploit the particular structure of the prime to obtain better performances ( like the "sloppy
reduction" or methods based on sliding windows).
If modular inversions can be delayed (like in a /-Pollard implementation), it is still a
good practice to use the method described by Montgomery in [12, p.209], in this way the
impact on performance of the inversion operations is ammortized.
Chapter 3
A new iterating function in the
rho-Pollard method
The -Polard method is the most ecient algorithm to solve generic ECDLP instances.
Further speed up can be obtained parallelizing the algorithm on multiple processor and
using automorphisms in the group structure. Unfortunately, while iterating, the algorithm
could close into loops that don't provide any information for the ECDLP resolution. These
loops are commonly called fruitless cycles. In this chapter it is presented a new iterating
function for the -Pollard algorithm. This function has the advantage that considerably
reduce the overhead to check for fruitless cycles when the algorithm is implemented taking
advantage by automorphism of order two also called negation maps.
3.1 The discrete logarithm problem
Denition 3.1.1. Let G be a group with an operation written multiplicatively. The discrete
logarithm problem (DLP) to the base g 2 G is:
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given y 2 G; nd an integer x such that gx = y: (3.1)
Note that such an integer x exists if and only if y belongs to the subgroup of G generated
by g, usually denoted by hgi. For example, if G is the multiplicative group of the positive
real numbers, then it is well known that the equation in (3.1) is solvable for any given y
with respect to any xed base g 6= 1, but the solution x = logg y is not necessarily an
integer. On the other side, the word discrete indicates that the computational problem
under consideration here is not the classical continuous case. Namely, (3.1) concerns with a
nite cyclic group hgi, where, by assuming that the order of hgi does not exceed n, one may
restrict the search for the DL to the interval 0  x  n   1. In particular, given integers
a; b that are nonzero modulo a prime p, the classical DLP is to nd an integer k such that1
ak  b mod p. Since k is a solution if and only if so is k+(p 1), any DL should be regarded
as being dened mod p 1, or modulo a divisor d of p 1 whenever ad  1 mod p. Analogous
considerations hold for the multiplicative group Fq of a nite eld. For example, by taking
G = F19 := (Z=19Z) and g = 2 it is readily seen that (3.1) is solvable for y = 7 with x = 6.
Finally, observe that, if the operation of G is assigned additively, then the equation
in (3.1) becomes xg = y. In particular, such an additive formulation applies to discrete
logarithm problem on the the elliptic curves (ECDLP):
for P;Q 2 E(Fq) nd an integer x such that Q = xP .
1Sometimes we write shortly ak p b.
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3.1.1 The Pollard rho method for discrete logarithms
There are several cryptographic applications of the DLP, where it turns out that the security
of the cryptosystems relies on the diculty of solving such a problem in a suitable nite
group. Trying all possible values of x to solve (3.1) becomes impractical when the solution is
an integer of several hundred digits, which is a typical size used in cryptography. Therefore,
some less trivial techniques have been introduced to attack DLP of cryptographic interests.
Among these one nds the index calculus in the multiplicative group of a nite eld [39],
that, however, does not work for DLP in a general nite abelian group of a rather large
order. In this regard, we remark that discrete logarithms in a nite abelian group2 G with
composite order can be eciently reduced to multiple instances of discrete logarithms into
subgroups of G through the method of Pohlig-Hellman [26]. Also we recall the baby step-
giant step method [32] that applies to any G and has both complexity and space requirements
O(
pjGj).
In 1975, John M. Pollard [27] introduced a so called Monte Carlo method to factor a
composite integer. Soon it turned out that very similar ideas can be adapted for discrete
logarithm computations. Indeed, in [28] there is a rst description of the so called rho
algorithm for the discrete logarithm in the group Fp. However, it was immediately clear
that the same method is applicable to any nite cyclic group G for which one can assign
numerical labels to the group elements and for which it is possible to perform eciently the
group operations and to check whether y = w for any y; w 2 G. Moreover, Pollard's setting
requires that G can be partitioned into r disjoint sets of roughly equal size for a suciently
small r (the original choice is r = 3), so that it can be eciently determined which of these
2Hereafter, when it is not explicitly mentioned, G denotes a nite abelian group.
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sets contains any given y 2 G. It has been observed that in general the algorithms based on
the rho method have roughly the same run time of those based on the baby step-giant step
method. However, the space requirements of the rho method that in the original settings is
O(
pjGj), can be reduced up to O(1) through some tricks at the expense of few calculations.
Moreover, an important feature of the rho method is that DLP computations can be easily
distributed to many processors.
The meaning of rho. At the core of the rho algorithms design there is a suitable choice
of an iterating function f : G! G that generates a sequence
xi+1 = f(xi)
from an arbitrarily chosen x0 2 G. Since G is nite, it is plain that there exist i0 < j0 such
that xi0 = xj0 . This immediately yields
xi0+1 = f(xi0) = f(xj0) = xj0+1
and more in general one gets the collisions (or matches) xi0+s = xj0+s for all integers s  0.
Thus, the resulting sequence fxigi0 is cyclic having a divisor of j0   i0 (proper or not) as
period. One might diagram such a sequence with the Greek letter , whose tail indicates
the precyclic part, while the cyclic part is represented by the oval of the letter.
One of the main aspects of such a periodic sequence is that the collisions yield relations
between dierent elements of G. Let us show how in the original rho method introduced by
Pollard one could exploit such matches in order to solve instances of the DLP in Fp.
The original setting of the rho method. Let us suppose that, given g; h 2 Fp = f1; 2; : : : ; p 
1g for any xed prime p > 3, our goal is to nd an integer k such that
gk  h mod p.
Assuming further that g is a generator of Fp (i.e. hgi = Fp) and recalling that gp 1 = 1,
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we might think of k as the least nonnegative value within a residue class modulo p  1 that
we are searching for, and simply write gk = h in Fp. Then, the original iterating function
fP : Fp ! Fp is dened as follows:
fP(x) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
gx if x 2 T1
x2 if x 2 T2
hx if x 2 T3
where Tj := [(j  1)p=3; jp=3]\Fp, j = 1; 2; 3. In particular, the sequence fxigi0 generated
by fP , with a starting point x0 = 1, is given by
xi = g
aihbi
where a0 = b0 = 0 and for any i  0 one has
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
ai+1 p 1 ai + 1 ; bi+1 = bi if xi 2 T1
ai+1 p 1 2ai ; bi+1 p 1 2bi if xi 2 T2
ai+1 = ai; bi+1 p 1 bi + 1 if xi 2 T3
Since which set Tj an element is in has seemingly nothing to do with the group Fp, one may
think of the sequence fxigi as random. Whenever a collision xi0 = gai0hbi0 = xj0 = gaj0hbj0
is found, then by using gk = h we can write gai0+kbi0 = gaj0+kbj0 , that infers
ai0   aj0  k(bj0   bi0) mod p  1.
Now, it is well known that the latter congruence has the solution
k  (bj0   bi0) 1(ai0   aj0) mod (p  1)=d ;
where d := g:c:d:(p  1; bj0   bi0) and (bj0   bi0) 1(bj0   bi0)  1 mod (p  1)=d.
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In particular, if d is suciently small, then it is possible to verify all the admissible d choices
for k:
k = (bj0   bi0) 1(ai0   aj0) +m(p  1)=d for some m = 0; : : : ; d  1 :
Note that the case d = 1 yields immediately the desired solution k = (bj0 bi0) 1(ai0 aj0)
for the DLP, indicating that we ran across a golden collision. On the other side, when
d = p  1 the above congruence equation does not allow to determine the discrete logarithm
k, and then one has to start over the algorithm to look for another collision. However, it is
worthwhile to remark that the case d < p 1 occurs with the large probability (p 2)=(p 1).
Later we will see that it may be assumed that there is at least a collision before O(
p
p)
iterations.
The general setting of the rho method into an additive group. For the sake of clarity,
in view of next discussion regarding the ECDLP, let us generalize the Pollard setting of the
rho method to a nite abelian group G written additively. So the DLP to the base P 2 G
is formulated as:
given Q 2 G; find an integer k such that kP = Q: (3.2)
Divide G into three disjoint subsets T1; T2; T3 of approximately the same size jGj=3 and
such that none of the Ti is a subgroup of G. Assuming that at random we can choose four
integers ai; bi 2 Z=nZ, i = 1; 2, where n := jGj, we dene the iterating function f : G ! G
as
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fP(X) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
X + a1P + b1Q if X 2 T1
2X if X 2 T2
X + a2P + b2Q if X 2 T3
Clearly, from a starting point a0P + b0Q 2 G the sequence generated by fP is of the type3
fujP + vjQgj0 with uj; vj 2 Z=nZ.
Therefore, the recurrence formula becomes
uj+1P + vj+1Q = ujP + vjQ+ aiP + biQ
m
(uj+1; vj+1) = (uj; vj) + (ai; bi) = (uj + ai; vj + bi) mod n.
Thus, a collision uj0P + vj0Q = ui0P + vi0Q in G is equivalent to the congruence k 
(vj0   vi0) 1(ui0   uj0) mod n=d , where d := g:c:d:(n; vj0   vi0).
Of course, at this point we can recover all the remarks previously drafted for the original
setting of the rho method. Further, note that here the case n prime is particularly sensitive,
because the possible choices for d are solely 1 and n, which correspond to a golden collision
and a starting over the algorithm, respectively.
3.1.2 Alternative iterating functions
The randomness of the iterating function. Any iterating sequence of the type described
before is a simulation of a walk in the group G. The niteness of G ensures that at some
point such a walk becomes a loop. However, the rst collision occurrence strictly depends
on the iterating function dened on G. For example, given f : Fp ! Fp, the largest integer
3Note that the straightforward analogous of Pollard's original function is obtained by taken a0 = b0 = 0,
a1 = b2 = 1 and a2 = b1 = 0.
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i such that for some x0 2 Fp the elements
x0; x1 = f(x0); x2 = f(x1); x3 = f(x2); :::; xi 1 = f(xi 2)
are all distinct, is the so-called epact of the prime p with respect to f .
In particular, if f is a linear function, i.e. f(x) = ax+ b, then it is easy to see that the epact
of p is p when pja  1 and p6 jb, while it is the order of a mod p if p 6 ja  1, and such an order
is usually a large divisor of p 1. Concerning quadratic functions of the form x2+ c, while it
is easily proved that c = 0; 2 produce bad epacts, it is still conjectured that for c = 1 the
epact of p is O(
p
p log p). Nevertheless, according to next proposition (see [18], Proposition
V.2.1) one could give an estimate of how many iterations are required before we encounter
the rst match.
Proposizione 3.1.1. Let GG denote the set of all the maps from a nite set G to itself and
for a xed integer m  1 let GG;m be the set of pairs (x0; f) 2 GGG such that the following
elements of G are distinct:
x0; f(x0); f(f(x0)); : : : ; ( f  f : : :  f| {z }
m times
)(x0).
If m = 1 +
p
2jGj for a xed real number  > 0, then
jGG;mj
jGGGj =
mY
j=1

1  jjGj

<
1
e
.
In particular, note that the latter upper bound does not depend on the cardinality of G,
which is generally large in the application.
Somehow, a rst motivation of the partitioning Fp into the rules Ti in the Pollard original
function is an attempt to reduce the possibility of long epacts. A further important reason
is that the basic assumption in the analysis of the expected run time of the rho method is
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the randomness of the walks. Indeed, it appears that the iterating function f and the initial
element x0 must be as much random as they can be, for otherwise either the algorithm
would fail most of the times or it would succeed for an instance of the DLP just because that
instance is not a problem at all. But what does random really mean here? According to
Teske [37][38], a function is random "in the sense that each of the jGjjGj functions f : G! G
is equally probable". Thus, by starting with a point randomly chosen in G according to
the uniform probability theory, one generates a so-called[38] random random walk. However,
since "the very notion of randomness is suspect in the world of Turing machine and serial
programs" [13], here we just say that, assuming that somehow the initial element x0 might
be chosen at random in the sense of probability theory, roughly speaking, an admissible
iterating function should always generate an unpredictable sequence fxigi0 of elements in
G. In other words, a priori the length of both the tail and the oval of the resulting  diagram
should be unknown, and the sole predictable fact should remain the certainty of collisions
at some points. Thus, what we always know is that there exist two uniquely determined
smallest integers, the preperiod   0 and the period   1, such that xi = xi+ for every
i  .
Adding walks and mixed walks. The expected value for  +  of the idealized version
of Pollard's rho method is proved to be close to4
p
jGj=2. Thus, the approximate value
1:2533
pjGj might be assumed to be the average number of generated items needed to have
more than 50% chances to generate a collision in an ideal situation. However, with the
support of experimental results, Teske [38] observed that the average performance of the
4Somehow this is related to the argument of the so called birthday problem (known also as birthday
paradox since the solution is a value incredibly small). The birthday problem is stated as follows: how many
people must be into a room to have a probability higher than 50% that two of them have the same birthday?
(considering only day and month of birth, and disregarding leap years). The answer is [
p
365=2] = 23.
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Pollard classical function, i.e. fP : Fp ! Fp, is worse than expected for a random mapping,
namely collisions occur after an average number of 1:37
p
p  1 iterations. Even worst is the
scenario regarding the generalization of the Pollard function for arbitrary groups (of prime
order), namely an experimental average of almost 1:56
pjGj iterations. In this sense, the
walks generated by the Pollard function are in general not random enough, from whence the
need of alternative iterating functions. Arguing heuristically, Teske showed that remarkable
improvements are allowed by increasing the number of the partition sets of the group, namely
up to r = 100 rules instead of r = 3 as in the Pollard case. Indeed, with an appropriate
choice of the parameters (for example a xed r  16) Teske's new functions yield an average
performance that is hardly distinguishable from the performance of a random mapping. For
example, in the case of an arbitrary group of rather large order experiments indicate that
r = 20 leads to a speed-up by about 20% compared to the Pollard function. A more general
heuristic due to Brent and Pollard implies that nonrandomness slows down this type of walk
by a factor
p
1  r 1.
Teske classies the iterating walks as r -adding walks and r + q-mixed walks, where r
and r + q denote the number of rules for the respective iterating functions. However, while
at each step of the rst walks it is performed one of the r prescribed additions, the mixed
walks include also the possibility of doublings as in the Pollard original setting. We describe
here the two type of walks for a nite abelian group G written additively.
Given positive integers r; q, let M1; : : : ;Mr 2 G be randomly chosen and let us take two
hash functions,
H : G! f1; :::; rg and K : G! f1; :::; r + qg :
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The functions fH : G ! G and fK : G ! G are said to be respectively r-adding and
r + q-mixed if they are dened as
fH(X) := X +MH(X); fK(X) :=
8>><>>:
X +MK(X) if 1  K(X)  r
2X if K(X)  r + 1
:
By setting for every i 2 f1; :::; rg; j 2 f1; :::; r + qg the rules
Hi := fY 2 G : H(Y ) = ig and Kj := fY 2 G : K(Y ) = jg ;
we obtain the more explicit assignments
fH(X) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
X +M1 if X 2 H1
...
...
...
X +Mi if X 2 Hi
...
...
...
X +Mr if X 2 Hr
fK(X) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
X +M1 if X 2 K1
...
...
...
X +Mr if X 2 Kr
2X if X 2 Kr+1
...
...
...
2X if X 2 Kr+q
Note that the Pollard original function fP is 2 + 1-mixed. Further, bearing in mind the
DLP (3.2), the pointsMi := aiP+biQ are precomputed with random generated ai; bi 2 Z=nZ,
where n := jGj. However, r-adding walks can be computed even if the group order is not
known. Indeed, since the increase of the terms in the above additions is linear in the number
of iterations, it is not necessary to perform the reduction modulo jGj.
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On the other side, while in [38] we read that
"In experiments with cyclic elliptic curve (sub)groups, collisions in 20-adding walks occur
after an average of 1:26
p
n. This is approximately the performance of a random walk."
in [5] it is asserted that
"Additive walks have disadvantages. The walks are noticeably nonrandom and need more
iterations than the generic rho method to nd a collision. This eect disappears as r grows,
but if r is large then the precomputed tableMi does not t into fast memory. Additive walks
also have trouble with automorphisms..."
The last sentence is important for our next discussion on the rho method on equivalence
classes. But rst let us devote the nal part of the present to a short excursion on the problem
of the collisions detection and the memory requirements in a rho algorithm implementation.
The collisions detection and the memory requirements. The trivial detection of the
collisions consists in storing any element generated while running the algorithm until the
next occurrence of a collision (hopefully a golden one that helps to solve the DLP). As
already mentioned, an algorithm based on the rho method runs in approximately the same
time as a baby step-giant step algorithm. However, a trivial detection of the collisions would
take around
pjGj storage, which is similar to baby step-giant step. Nevertheless, at the
cost of a little more computation, a strong improvement concerning the space complexity
for the rho method with respect to the naive collisions detection can be obtained through
an expedient, the so-called Floyd cycle-nding method, also known as the tortoise and the
hare algorithm, that we describe as follows.
Beyond the usual sequence generated by the iterating function f applied once at each
step, it is required to generate another sequence by a double application of f . That is
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Xj+1 = f(Xj) (the tortoise walk)
X2(j+1) = f(f(X2j)) (the hare walk)
Clearly, the hare sequence is a subsequence of the tortoise one. The key observation is
that once there is a collision for two indices diering by the period of the tortoise sequence,
all subsequent indices diering by such a period will yield collisions. More precisely, if   0
and   1 are respectively the preperiod and the period of the rst sequence, then one has
j   ^ jj =) X2j = Xj.
Hence, the Floyd method requires the computation of the pairs (Xj; X2j) for j = 0; 1; : : :,
but only the storage of the current pair at each step. With such a simple expedient the space
requirements are lowered to O(1) at the cost of the extra computation of the hare sequence.
Another method of nding a match consists in storing only points that satisfy a certain
property (call them distinguished points), that should be easily testable to avoid an high
overhead on computations. A typical distinguishing requirement is the last w bits of the
binary representation of the x-coordinate to be 0. Thus, on the average, one out of every
2w points Xi is stored. If Xi is not one of the distinguished points, but it is involved in
a collision like Xi = Xj, then one might expect Xi+s to be a distinguished point for some
s such that 1  s  2w, approximately. Consequently, one gets the collision Xi+s = Xj+s
between distinguished points with only a little more computation. Note that on one hand
a small value of w gives more chances to detect a collision at an earlier step, on the other
it increases the number of stored points. Clearly, for w = 0 the space complexity does not
dier from the trivial detection.
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3.2 The rho method via the negation map
3.2.1 The rho method on equivalence classes
An alternative use of the rho method on a nite abelian group G is to iterate a walk trough
the equivalence classes introduced by a given equivalence relation on G. In other words, we
can iterate a function on the quotient group of G with respect to such a relation. Since the
cardinality of the quotient group, i.e. the number of the equivalence classes, is of the type
jGj=m, a collision between equivalence classes should be found in an ideal timepjGj=(2m),
which improves on
p
jGj=2 plainly when m > 1.
Equivalence classes by automorphisms. A way to introduce equivalence relations on G
is by using automorphisms of G. Assuming that G is written additively, recall that an
automorphism of G is a bijective map
 : G! G such that (X + Y ) = (X) + (Y ) for all X;Y 2 G.
The set of the automorphisms of G is denoted by Aut(G) and the map composition
makes Aut(G) a group of order jGj. Samples of automorphisms are the identity map and
the negation map, respectively
id : X 2 G! id(X) = X 2 G,
 id : X 2 G!  id(X) =  X 2 G.
By denition 0 = id for every  2 Aut(G). The order of  2 Aut(G) is the least
nonnegative integer m such that
m :=    : : :  | {z }
m times
= id.
In particular, the negation map has order 2 being plain that ( id)2 = id. Any  2 Aut(G)
induces an equivalence relation in G:
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X  Y () Y = i(X) for some nonnegative integer i,
and an equivalence class is denoted as X = fY 2 G : Y  Xg.
If the order of  is m, then the quotient group of G with respect to the equivalence
relation induced by  has cardinality jGj=m. As said, in this case the rho algorithm applied
to the equivalence classes would have an expected speed-up of
p
m. However, there are basic
requirements for the method to work eciently like the relatively easiness of computing
equivalence classes. In this regard, the negation map is with no doubt the most simple one.
Iterating functions on equivalence classes. We could choose an iterating function f that
operates as usual trough the group G, while we could search for the matches on the equiva-
lence classes only: if the points Pi; Pj of an iterating sequence generated by f are in the same
class, i.e. Pi = Pj, then we try to nd a collision between elements of the class. However, in
order to avoid non-deterministic path when one has to parallelize the algorithm (see [16]),
it is advisable to look for iterating functions well dened on the equivalence classes, that is
f(X) = f(Y ) whenever X = Y , and to iterate as Pi+1 2 f(Pi).
3.2.2 The inverse-point strategy for the ECDLP
It is well known that in the case of an elliptic group E(K), the order of its automorphism
group is a divisor of 24, depending on the characteristic char(K) of the eld K and the
so called j-invariant j(E) of E(K) (see [33], Ch.3, Theorem 10.1). More precisely, for
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j0 := 3  242 = 1728 one has
jAut(E(K))j =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
2 if j(E) 6= 0; j0
4 if j(E) 6= j0; char(K) 6= 2; 3
6 if j(E) 6= 0; char(K) 6= 2; 3
12 if j(E) = 0 = j0; char(K) = 3
24 if j(E) = 0 = j0; char(K) = 2
For the anomalous curve (or Koblitz curves) over binary extensions elds F2m , Wiener
and Zuccherato [40] exploit the Frobenius automorphism of degree m in the rho algorithm
application to obtain a speed-up by a factor of up to
p
2m. In the same paper, an inverse-
point strategy is introduced in order to exploit the simplicity of the negation map of an
elliptic group over a nite eld K = Fpm . Since such an automorphism has order 2, the
strategy allows a speed-up by a factor of up to
p
2 in the application of the rho algorithm to
the ECDLP. As already observed, through the equivalence relation induced by the negation
map each group element P is paired with its inverse  P in order to halve the search space
of the algorithm.
Within the implementation of the Pollard rho algorithm for the ECDLP via the negation
map, the equivalence class P = fP; Pg is usually represented by the point with y-coordinate
of least absolute value.
3.2.3 A technicality of the strategy: fruitless cycles
Dealing with equivalence classes, it is not surprising that the most obvious usage of the
automorphisms in the context of the Pollard rho method leads to useless cycles trapping the
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random walks, that is the iterating process falls into a loop that keeps on generating always
the same equivalence class. Commonly called fruitless cycles, such loops do not provide any
useful information for the ECDLP resolution right after their rst occurrence.
The occurrence of 2-cycles. If the rho algorithm is implemented via the negation map,
i.e. the inverse-point strategy, it is easy to explain why fruitless cycles of length 2 might
appear. In this regard, let us consider a r-adding function fH dened on an elliptic group
E(Fpm). Further, let us assume that by the negation map each P = (x; y) 2 E(Fpm) is
identied with  P , but fH is always applied to the representative of the class P with the
least y-coordinate. Thus, it might happen that two consecutive points, Ri and Ri+1 say, of
an iterating sequence generated by fH satisfy both the following properties:
1) H(Ri) = H(Ri+1) = j, i.e. Ri; Ri+1 2 Hj, that yields
Ri+1 2 Ri +Mj and Ri+2 2 Ri+1 +Mj
2) Ri+1 =  (Ri+Mj) is the representative of the class Ri +Mj that has to be chosen in
order to calculate Ri+2 = fH(Ri+1)
Consequently, it turns out that Ri+2 = fH( Ri Mj) =  Ri Mj+Mj =  Ri, revealing
the occurrence of the 2-cycle Ri+2 = Ri.
The probability of the fruitless cycles. More in general, a rho algorithm implemented
with a r-adding function fH on the equivalence class dened by a  2 Aut(E(Fpm)) might
be aected by fruitless cycles of length t like
R1; R2; :::; Rt; Rt+1 = R1;
that can be analyzed as follows. Let us set ri := H(Ri) for i = 1; 2; : : : ; t and, if Ri+1 is
picked as the representative of the class fH(Ri) = Ri +Mri via the automorphism "i := 
mi ,
then we write
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["i](Ri +Mri) := Ri+1
Thus, it is easy to see that
[" 1t ]Rt+1 = ["t 1:::"1]R1 + T
where T := ["t 1:::"1]Mr1 + ["t 1:::"2]Mr2 + ::: + ["t 1]Mrt 1 +Mrt .
Thus, this is a fruitless cycles of length t if T = O, where O is the innity point of the
curve. As already said, we may assume that the points Mj are randomly chosen, so that
there is no trivial relation between them involving powers of . If this is the case, then a
necessary condition for having T = O is that for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; tg exists a j 6= i such that
H(Ri) = H(Rj).
Clearly, the speedup of the rho method via the automorphisms depends on the expected
number of t-cycles. In this regard, let us quote Proposition 31 from [16].
Proposizione 3.2.1. If P(t) denotes the probability that a useless t-cycle occurs when a
r-adding function is iterated on the equivalence classes dened by  2 Aut(G) of order m,
then
P(t) 
min(r;t=2)X
k=1
1
mk
min

1;
r!kt
(r   k)!rt

:
More precisely, for t 2 f2; 3; 4g one has
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t pattern P(t)
2 r1 = r2 = (mr)
 1
3 = 0 if 3 6 jm,
 2(mr) 2 if 3jm
4 r1 = r2 = r3 = r4  (1  1=m)2m 1r 2
r1 = r1 = r3; r2 = r4 = (1  1=r)(mr) 2
Note that the expected number of t-cycles is P(t)tjGj=m, and in particular for t = 2 it
is jGj=2r. Further, observe that the probability to nd a t-cycle reduces as r and t increase.
On the other side, large values of r are impractical, while the most promising medium values
are not always compatible with all environments (see [6]). So the detection of the cycles
occurrence and recurrence and their treatment are key topics in the development of the rho
algorithms when dealing with negation maps or other automorphisms.
Eliminating the fruitless cycles. In the literature there are many concrete proposals on
the use of the negation map in the Pollard rho method. Mostly, they are a combination
of several ideas for avoiding, detecting, and escaping fruitless cycles. A good review and
comparison of such proposals is the Appendix of [5], where the authors remark that none
of the proposed algorithms perform eciently on SIMD architectures because of frequent
conditional operations.
In the same paper [5] an alternative method to detect and escape fruitless cycles is deeply
discussed. Basically it requires checking from time to time fruitless 2-cycles, while longer
cycles are checked even more rarely, because 2-cycles appear with the larger probability
(2r) 1 according to the previous Proposition. Further, 2-cycles persist after they appear,
wasting subsequent iterations (in the sense that new points and new collision opportunities do
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not occur), until we check for them. A planned check every w iterations yields approximately
the probability w(2r) 1 that a 2-cycle appears, and for it we expect to waste approximately
w=2 iterations on average if it does appear. However, a sharply small value for w does not
become necessary here. Indeed, if a cycle has not appeared, then checking for it wastes an
iteration. Thus, the total of wasted iterations amounts to one iteration for the check plus
the average number of wasted iterations multiplied by the probability that a 2-cycle occurs:
1 + (w=2)w=(2r) = 1 + w2=(4r) out of w.
An optimization of the quotient (1 + w2=(4r))w 1 = 1=w + w=(4r) requires w to be very
close to 2
p
r.
More generally, fruitless cycles of relatively small length t appear with probability ap-
proximately proportional to (
p
r) t , so the optimal checking frequency is approximately
proportional to (
p
r) t=2, which rapidly goes to zero as t increases.
In [5] the authors also claim that their PlayStation 3 software takes r = 2048 checks
for 2-cycles every 48 iterations, and checks for larger cycles with even lower frequency. To
simplify the software they unify the checks for 4-cycles and 6-cycles into a check for 12-cycles
every 49152 iterations, whereas the choice r = 512 requires checking for 2-cycles every 24
iterations.
The occasional check for 2-cycles works as follows. One computes Ri+2 and checks if it
is equal to Ri. Then, the denition of Ri+3 changes according to the two possible cases (but
the rst one is the most probable):
Ri+3 :=
8>><>>:
Ri+2 if Ri+2 6= Ri
k2min(Ri+2; Ri+1)k if Ri+2 = Ri
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where min(Ri+2; Ri+1) is taken in the lexicographic sense and the symbol kRk means that
one has to take the point in the class R according to a prexed canonical selection (such as
the least y-coordinate or the parity of the y-coordinate). Similarly, one proceeds in case of
fruitless cycles of lengths 6; 8, etc., up to the smallest even length that exceeds (log n)=(log r),
where n is the order of the elliptic group. This escaping technique was used earlier by Escott
([14]).
Now observe that, from a point on the cycle, R = aP + bQ say, the subsequent points
are generated by adding one of the Mi = aiP + biQ or by doubling, and negating if needed.
If c  1 is the number of doublings in the cycle, then we get a relation of the form
R = 2cR +
r 1X
i=0
ciMi = 2cR +
r 1X
i=0
ciaiP +
r 1X
i=0
cibiQ
with ci 2 Z, that yields

(1 2c)a 
r 1X
i=0
ciai

P +

(1 2c)b 
r 1X
i=0
cibi

Q = O :
Since 1 2c 6= 0, the expression (1 2c)a Pr 1i=0 ciai is most likely not divisible by the
group order. This is the argument that Bos, Kleinjung and Lenstra ([7]) followed to get the
following heuristic: a cycle with at least one doubling is most likely not fruitless.
3.3 A new iterating function
Anything that breaks linearity would be convenient.
This is what Duursma, Gaudry and Morain claim while they tell about Taking care of
useless cycles in [16]. So we try to break linearity in a linear way by proposing the following
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iterating function for the Pollard rho algorithm. It is a sort of r+1-mixed function, but has
two variables: the rst one for an element of the group and the other for the step number of
the iteration.
More precisely, for a xed integer r  3 letM1; : : : ;Mr be preassigned points of an elliptic
group E(Fpm). Then, we set
FH(X; i) :=
8>><>>:
X +MH(X)+i if i 6 0 mod r
2X if i  0 mod r
where the hash value H(X) is the least positive residue mod r of the x coordinate of X
and H(Mk) r k (hereafter, the index k of Mk is always reduced mod r).
From a starting pair (X0; 1) with a randomly chosen X0 2 E(Fpm), the initial r+1 steps
of the iterating sequence Xi+1 := FH(Xi; i+ 1) are
X0
X0+Mx0+1 ! X1
X1+Mx1+2 ! X2  ! : : :  ! Xi
Xi+Mxi+i+1 ! Xi+1  ! : : :
: : :  ! Xr 2
Xr 2+Mxr 2+r 1 ! Xr 1 2Xr 1 ! Xr Xr+Mxr+1 ! Xr+1 : : :
where for brevity we have set H(Xj) := xj. More in general, for any index i  0 and any
integer s  1 one has
Xi+s = Xi +
i+s 1X
j=i
Yj ; (3.3)
where
Yj :=
8>><>>:
Mxj+j+1 if j + 1 6 0 mod r
Xj if j + 1  0 mod r
:
The period of the iterating sequence. From (3.3) it follows immediately that a collision
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Xi+s = Xi occurs if and only if
s(Xi) :=
i+s 1X
j=i
Yj = O :
Moreover, for every i  0 and every s  1 it turns out that
s(Xi+1) = s(Xi) + Yi+s   Yi .
Thus, if we assume that Xi+s = Xi for some s  0 mod r, it is easily seen that Yi+s = Yi,
which in turn yields s(Xi+1) = O. Therefore,
Xi+s = Xi for some s r 0 =) Xi+s+1 = Xi+1 :
More in general, by induction on k we have the following implication between collisions of
points at distance s  0 mod r:
Xi+s = Xi =) Xi+s+k = Xi+k for every k  0 :
The above discussion and next proposition show that the period of the sequence Xj has
to be necessarily a multiple of r.
Proposizione 3.3.1. Let s 6 0 mod r. Then
Xi+s = Xi =) Xi+s+1 6= Xi+1 : (3.4)
Proof. Let us assume that (3.4) is not true for some i, i.e. one has the simultaneous
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occurrence of the matches
Xi+s = Xi and Xi+s+1 = Xi+1 : (3.5)
This is equivalent to s(Xi) = s(Xi+1) = O, that implies Yi+s = Yi.
Now, since s 6 0 mod r, the only possible cases are:
1) i+ 1 6r 0 and i+ s+ 1 6r 0
2) i+ 1 6r 0 and i+ s+ 1 r 0
3) i+ 1 r 0
Let us show that (3.5) leads to a contradiction in all the cases above.
1) Note that
i+ 1 6r 0 =) Yi = Mxi+i+1;
i+ s+ 1 6r 0 =) Yi+s = Mxi+s+i+s+1 = Mxi+i+s+1;
where the last equality holds because Xi+s = Xi. Hence, from (3.5) and the previous
implications we infer that Mxi+i+1 = Yi = Yi+s = Mxi+i+s+1 in contradiction with the
hypothesis s 6 0 mod r.
2) In this case one has
i+ 1 6r 0 =) Yi = Mxi+i+1;
i+ s+ 1 r 0 =) Yi+s = Xi+s :
Hence, from (3.5) we see that Mxi+i+1 = Yi = Yi+s = Xi+s = Xi, which yields H(Xi) =
H(Mxi+i+1) r xi + i+ 1 r H(Xi) + i+ 1 against i+ 1 6r 0.
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3) Since s 6 0 mod r, then from i+ 1 r 0 it follows i+ s+ 1 6r 0. Therefore, in this case
(3.5) implies
Xi = Yi = Yi+s = Mxi+i+s+1 = Mxi+s ;
again a contradiction with s 6 0 mod r.
This conclude the proof of the proposition.
Formula (3.3) suggests that any subsequence fXjgjmod r can be seen as generated by a
classical Pollard rho function whose rules are given by r(Xj), that prescribes a succession
of r addition (one of which is a doubling). Seen in this way, the new function has the same
behaviour of a classical iterating function of one variable. Thus, r valid points are generated
on the curve, and hopefully a couple of distinguished points to solve the ECDLP.
The occurence of kr-cycles. For what we have seen before, the smallest cycle that can appear
within such an iterating function5 is after r steps of the iterating function. By taking s = kr
in (3.3) for some k  1 we have
Xi+kr = Xi +
i+kr 1X
j=i
Yj = Xi +
kr 1X
t=0
Yt+i :
Now, let us consider ir 2 f0; : : : ; r   1g such that ir + i+ 1 r 0 and write
Xi+kr = Xi +
ir 1X
t=0
Mt;i + (etpt) +
ir+r 1X
t=ir+1
Mt;i + (etpt)+
ir+2r 1X
t=ir+r+1
Mt;i + (etpt) + : : :+
ir+(k 1)r 1X
t=ir+(k 2)r+1
Mt;i + (etpt) +
kr 1X
t=ir+(k 1)r+1
Mt;i ;
where we mean all the sums of the Mt;i := Mxt+i+t+i+1 to be zero when ir = 0, and at any
5As usual, we also assume that the pointsMi are randomly generated and there are in no trivial relations.
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(etpt) we mean that one has to add "everything that precedes this" (etpt). More precisely,
for
P0 := Xi +
ir 1X
t=0
Mt;i = Xi+ir ;
X
(j)
:=
ir+jr 1X
t=ir+(j 1)r+1
Mt;i; (j = 1; : : : ; k   1);
since
kr 1X
t=ir+(k 1)r+1
Mt;i = Xi+kr  Xi+ir+(k 1)r :
it is easy to see that
Xi+kr = 2
kP0 + 2
k 1X
(1)
+2k 2
X
(2)
+ : : :+ 2
X
(k 1)
+
kr 1X
t=ir+(k 1)r+1
Mt;i =
2kP0 +
k 1X
j=1
2k j
X
(j)
+Xi+kr  Xi+ir+(k 1)r :
Hence, this reduces to
Xi+ir+(k 1)r = 2
kP0 +
k 1X
j=1
2k j
X
(j)
:
In case of a collision Xi+kr = Xi, one has Xi+ir+(k 1)r = Xi+ir = P0 and we conclude that a
cycle is possible only if
P0 = 2
kP0 +
k 1X
j=1
2k j
X
(j)
;
where X
(j)
:=
ir+jr 1X
t=ir+(j 1)r+1
Mt;i
has r   1 summands picked with possible repetitions from the set of the r precomputed
points Mi. So that they are

2r 1
r 1

.
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The previous expression is similar to the one we quoted previously from [7], where with
a heuristic argument the authors assert that only small cycles have to be taken into account
when using a function that generates mixed random walks. However, with our new iterating
function there is no need to check for cycles smaller than r.
Chapter 4
Smart's attack and elliptic curves over
rings
The purpose of the work described in this chapter is to adapt to elliptic curves over a ring
Z=nZ with n points the attack to the ECDLP over anomalous curves (over nite elds)
as described by Smart in [35]. This experimental project required the implementation on
SAGE of the functions to work on elliptic curves dened over rings and a basic arithmetic to
work on polyadic numbers. The research led to some results concerning amicable pairs like
lemma 4.4.1 and showed that, starting with a curve E 0(Fp) with ]E 0(Fp) = q, sometimes is
really easy to build a curve E 00(Fq) with ]E 00(Fq) = p. Right now this is a work that is still
in progress and it's being the object of further investigations.
4.1 The anomalous elliptic curves over a eld Fp
An elliptic curve E dened over a eld Fp is said to be anomalous if ]E(Fp) = p or equiv-
alently if the trace of Frobenius t = p + 1   ]E(Fp) = 1. These curves are particularly
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weak from a cryptographic point of view. The rst attacks described on these curves were
proposed by Semaev[31] and Satoh-Araki[30]. In the following we will describe the attack
by Smart [35], but, before talking of the attack, we need some tools.
4.1.1 Lifts and Hensel's Lemma
Given a polynomial f(X) 2 Z[X] and a x such that f(x)  0mod p, if we want to nd x0
such that f(x0)  0mod p2 and x0  xmod p, we can use the Hensel's Lemma:
Theorem 4.1.1. For f(X) 2 Z[X] let x a root modulo ps and let f 0(x) be invertible modulo
p. If we call u the inverse of f(x) modulo p, then
x0 = x  uf 0(x)
is such that x0  xmod ps and f(x0)  0mod ps+1.
The value x0 is called lift of x modulo ps+1. The Hensel's Lemma, allow us to lift a
solution of a polynomial, from a base eld to any extension of it and also to p-adic numbers.
4.1.2 p-adic numbers
Given a prime p and a rational number a, then a can be expressed as a = pr m
n
where r 2 N
and m;n 2 Z are not divisible by p. We then dene
ordp(a) = r and jajp =
8>>><>>>:
p r; if a 6= 0
0; if a = 0
:
The function j:jp : Q! [0;1) is a norm on Q, in fact:
1. jajp = 0, a = 0
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2. jabjp = jajpjbjp
3. ja+ bjp  jajp + jbjp
This norm satisfy a stronger condition than the common triangular inequality(3):
ja+ bjp  maxfjajp; jbjpg
and induce a metric dp(:; :) on Q dened as:
dp(a; b) = ja  bjp
The eld Qp of p-adic numbers is dened as the completion of Q for the metric dp.
The elements of this eld are the equivalence classes of the Cauchy sequences, where two
sequences are equivalent if their dierence converges to zero according the metric dened
above.
Every element x of Qp can be written in a unique way as an innite series:
1P
i=k
aip
i
where k is some integer for which ak 6= 0 and each ai 2 0; : : : ; p  1.
This series, according to the metric dp, converges to x.
An element a 2 Qp is called p-adic integer, if ordp(a)  0 and the set of p-adic integers
is denoted as Zp.
4.1.3 Expansion around O of an elliptic curve
Let's consider an elliptic curve E dened over a eld K by a Weierstrass equation
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (4.1)
4.1. THE ANOMALOUS ELLIPTIC CURVES OVER A FIELD FP 61
with the following change of variables
u =  x
y
and w =   1
y
we obtain a new representation of the elliptic curve in uw coordinates, where the equation
that describe the curve become:
w = u3 + a1uw + a2u
2w + a3w
2 + a4uw
2 + a6w
3 (4.2)
If we substituite the equation recursively into itself, we obtain w as a power series in u:
w = u3 + (a1u+ a2u
2)w + (a3 + a4u)w
2 + a6w
3 = (4.3)
= u3 + (a1u+ a2u
2)(u3 + (a1u+ a2u
2)w + (a3 + a4u)w
2 + a6w
3) + (4.4)
+ (a3 + a4u)(u
3 + (a1u+ a2u
2)w + (a3 + a4u)w
2 + a6w
3)2 + (4.5)
+ a6(u
3 + (a1u+ a2u
2)w + (a3 + a4u)w
2 + a6w
3)3 (4.6)
= : : : = u3 + a1u
4 + (a21 + a2)u
5 + (a31 + 2a1a2 + a3)u
6 + (4.7)
+ (a41 + 3a
2
1a2 + 3a1a3 + a
2
2 + a4)u
7 + : : : (4.8)
This procedure can be shown to converge [33, Chapter IV, Proposition 1.1] to a power
series w(u) 2 Z[a1; a2; a3; a4; a6][[u]].
From the power series w(u) obtained, we can derive the Laurent series for x and y:
x(u) =
u
w(u)
=
1
u2
  a1
u
  a2   a3u  (a4 + a1a3)u2   : : : (4.9)
y(u) =   1
w(u)
=   1
u3
+
a1
u2
+
a2
u
+ a3 + (a4 + a1a3)u+ : : : (4.10)
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The couple (x(u); y(u)) is a formal solution of the equation 4.1, meaning that substituiting
the power series for x(u) and y(u) we obtain the same formal power series on each side. To
obtain the points of an elliptic curve E(K) through the u-coordinate, it is needed that the
series x(u) and y(u) converge in the eld K.
If K = Qp the convergence is assured[33] if ordp(u)  1 (or equivalently u is in the
maximal ideal of Qp) and if coecients a1; a2; a3; a4; a6 are in Zp.
4.1.4 Reduction mod p
If we have an elliptic curve E dened over Qp we can obtain the curve ~E(Fp) reducing the
coecients of E modulo p. Similarly, if A = (x1; y1; z1) is a point on E(Qp) we obtain the
reduced point ~A on ~E(Fp) reducing the coordinates of A modulo p. In this way it is dened
a reduction map:
E(Qp) ! ~E(Fp) (4.11)
A ! ~A (4.12)
4.1.5 Formal group associated to an elliptic curve
From the formal power series x(u) and y(u) it can be derived another formal power series
that express the addition law for E(K). Given two points (u1; w1) and (u2; w2) of an elliptic
curve E(K), the coordinate u3 of the sum of these points is given by the following power
series:
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u3 = F (u1; u2) = u1+u2 u1u2 a2(u21u2+2a3u1u32) (2a3u31u2 a1a2 3a3)u21u22+2a3u1u32)+: : :
(4.13)
From the corresponding properties for E, we deduce that also the power series F (u1; u2)
satisfy commutativity, associativity and existence of inverse. This power series F (u1; u2) is
called formal group associated to the elliptic curve E(K) and can be seen as "a group law
without any group elements" [33].
If E is an elliptic curve dened over Qp, the group E^(pZp) is the set pZp with the addition
law x y := F (x; y), for all x; y 2 pZp.
It can be built a group isomorphism logF : E(pZp) ! pZp, where pZp is equipped with
the usual addition law. Since it is an isomorphism, we must have:
logF F (u1; u2) = logF (u1) + logF (u2) with u1; u2 2 pZp (4.14)
To obtain this isomorphism the rst thing needed is a power series P , such that
P (F (T; S))FX(T; S) = P (T ) (4.15)
where FX is the partial derivative of F with respect to the rst variable. Setting T = 0 we
have
P (S)FX(0; S) = P (0): (4.16)
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So, every power series P that satisfy 4.15, has the form:
P (T ) = aFX(0; T )
 1 with a 2 Qp: (4.17)
If we choose a = 1, P has the form
P (T ) = 1 + d1T + d2T
2 + d3T
3 + : : : (4.18)
The formal logarithm map is the power series
logF (T ) =
Z
P (T )dT = T +
d1
2
T 2 +
d2
3
T 3 + : : : (4.19)
To show that it is an homomorphism we integrate 4.15 with respect to T obtaining
logF F (T; S) = logF (T ) + C(S) (4.20)
where C(S) is a constant depending on S. If we set T = 0, we obtain
C(S) = logF (S) (4.21)
To show that logF induces an isomorphism from E(pZp) to pZp it is needed an inverse power
series that converges on pZp. This power series is called expF and its existence is guaranteed
by a classical result on the formal power series [33, ch.IV, lemma 2.4].
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4.1.6 The subgroups En(Qp)
In the description of the Smart's attack on anomalous elliptic curves it is useful to dene
the subgroup
En(Qp) = P 2 E(Qp)j ordp(x(P )))   2n [O1 (4.22)
where x(P ) is the x-coordinate of the point P . Among all groups En(Qp), two of them
play an important role:
 E0(Qp) = ~E(Fp)
 E1(Qp) = fP 2 E(Qp) : ~P = ~O1g
where~denotes the reduction mod p. In general each of the groups En(Qp) is isomorphic to
E^(pnZp).
4.1.7 Smart's attack
Given an elliptic curve ~E(Fp) with ] ~E(Fp) = p, as rst step to compute the value m such
that ~Q = [m] ~P with ~Q; ~P 2 ~E(Fp) we compute the lifts P;Q 2 E(Qp) of ~P; ~Q through the
Hensel's lifting. Since the reduction modulo p is an homomorphism, we have
Q  [m]P = R 2 E1(Qp) (4.23)
We have that ~E(Fp) ' E(Qp)=E1(Qp) and [33, Chapter VII, ex. 7.4] E1(Qp)=E2(Qp) '
F+p .
From the relations above and since ] ~E(Fp) = p, we have that the multiplication by [p]
maps the elements of E(Qp) to E1(Qp) and elements of E1(Qp) to E2(Qp).
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If we multiply both sides of equation 4.23 by p, we obtain:
[p]Q  [m]([p]P ) = [p]R 2 E2(Qp) (4.24)
Since both [p]P and [p]Q are in E1(Qp), we can apply the isomorphism logF to obtain
logF ([p]Q) m logF ([p]P ) 2 p2Zp: (4.25)
and from this equation we can derive m simply computing logF [p]Q
logF [p]P
mod p.
4.2 Elliptic curves over rings
Elliptic curves can be also dened on commutative rings. The most important application of
elliptic curves over rings is in the factorization method proposed by Lenstra [15] and known
as ECM (Elliptic Curves Method). When an elliptic curve is dened over a ring the addition
and doubling formulas dened for elliptic curves over elds may fail, anyway, a full theory
of elliptic curves on commutative rings can be dened through a dierent set of addition
formulas. Let R a ring (commutative and with 1), a tuple of elements (x1; x2; : : :) of R is
said to be primitive if there exist elements r1; r2; : : : 2 R such that r1x1+r2x2+ : : : = 1. Two
primitive triples (x; y; z) and (x0; y0; z0) are said to be equivalent if there exists a unit u 2 R
such that (x0; y0; z0) = (ux; uy; uz). A two dimensional projective space on R is dened as:
P 2(R) = f(x; y; z) 2 R3j(x; y; z) is primitiveg mod equivalence (4.26)
The equivalence class of (x; y; z) is denoted by (x : y : z).
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Two additional conditions are needed to dene elliptic curves over rings:
1. 2 2 R
2. If (aij) is an m  n matrix such that (a11; a12; : : : ; amn) is primitive and such that all
22 subdeterminants vanish, then some R-linear combination of the rows is a primitive
n-tuple.
If we have a ring R satisfying conditions 1 and 2 described above, an elliptic curve E on
R is given by an homogeneous equation
y2z = x3 + Axz2 +Bz3 (4.27)
with A;B 2 R such that 4A3 + 27B2 2 R. Dene
E(R) = f(x : y : z) 2 P 2(R)jy2z = x3 + Axz2 +Bz3g: (4.28)
On this set the addition laws are much more complicated that the ones for elliptic curves
over rings. Given (xi; yi; zi) 2 E(R) for i = 1; 2, we consider the following three sets of
equations:
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1.
x03 = (x1y2   x2y1)(y1z2 + y2z1) + (x1z2   x2z1)y1y2
  A(x1z2 + x2z1)(x1z2   x2z1)  3B(x1z2   x2z1)z1z2
y03 =  3x1x2(x1y2x2y1)  y1y2(y1z2   y2z1)  A(x1y2   x2y1)z1z2
+ A(x1z2   x2z1)(y1z2   y2z1) + 3B(y1z2   y2z1)z1z2
z03 = 3x1x2(x1z2   x2z1)  (y1z2 + y2z1)(y1z2   y2z1)
+ A(x1z2   x2z1)z1z2
2.
x003 = y1y2(x1y2 + x2y1)  Ax1x2(y1z2 + y2z1)  A(x1y2 + x2y1)(x1z2 + x2z1)
  3B(x1y2 + x2y1)z1z2   3B(x1z2 + x2z1)(y1z2 + y2z1) + A2(y1z2 + y2z1)z1z2
y003 = y
2
1y
2
2 + 3Ax
2
1x
2
2 + 9Bx1x2(x1z2 + x2z1)  A2x1z2(x1z2 + 2x2z1)
  A2x2z1(2x1z2 + x2z1)  3ABz1z2(x1z2 + x2z1)  (A3 + 9B2)z21z22
z003 = 3x1x2(x1y" + x2y1) + y1y2(y1z2 + y2z1) + A(x1y2 + x2y1)z1z2
+ A(x1z2 + x2z1)(y1z2 + y2z1) + 3B(y1z2 + y2z1)z1z2
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3.
x0003 = (x1y2 + x2y1)(x1y2   x2y1) + Ax1x2(x1z2   x2z1)
+ 3B(x1z2 + x2z1)(x1z2   x2z1)  A2(x1z2   x2z1)z1z2
y0003 = (x1y2 + x2y1)y1y2   3Ax1x2(y1z2   y2z1) + A(x1y2 + x2y1)(x1z2   x2z1)
+ 3B(x1y2   x2y1)z1z2   3B(x1z2 + x2z1)(y1z2   y2z1) + A2(y1z2   y2z1)z1z2
z0003 =  (x1y2 + x2y1)(y1z2   y2z1)  (x1z2   x2z1)y1y2
  A(x1z2 + x2z1)(x1z2   x2z1)  3B(x1z2   x2z1)z1z2
A complete system of addition laws for E(R) is a collection of addition laws with the
property that for any pair of points on E(R), at least one of the addition laws can be used
to add the points. It can be shown [8][19][20] that the minimal cardinality of a complete
system of addition law for elliptic curves over rings is two. If we refer to the equation given
above, we have a complete system if we consider the addition laws:
 x03; y03; z03 and x003; y003 ; z003
 x003; y003 ; z003 and x0003 ; y0003 ; z0003
while the set consisting of addition laws x03; y
0
3; z
0
3 and x
000
3 ; y
000
3 ; z
000
3 do not form a complete
system of addition laws. The justication to the last sentence can be easily found if we
consider the so called exceptional set of points for a given addition law.
A couple of points is exceptional for a given addition law if that addition law cannot be
used to add those points.
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A pair of points P1; P2 is exceptional[8]
 for x03; y03; z03 if and only if P1 = P2
 for x003; y003 ; z003 if and only if the dierence of the y-coordinate of P1   P2 is zero
 for x0003 ; y0003 ; z0003 if and only if the dierence of the x-coordinate of P1   P2 is zero.
These set of equations, when R is a eld, give the usual group law and the output is a
point in P 2(R).
Theorem 4.2.1. Let n1; n2 be odd integers such that gcd(n1; n2) = 1 and let E be an elliptic
curve dened over Z=n1n2Z. Then there is a group isomorphism[39]
E(Z=n1n2Z) ' E(Z=n1Z) E(Z=n2Z) (4.29)
Proof. Suppose that E is given by an equation like 4.27 with A;B;2 Z=n1n2Z and 4A3 +
27B2 2 (Z=n1n2Z). We can also consider A and B as elements of Z=niZ and 4A3+27B2 2
(Z=niZ). From the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we know that there is an isomorphism of
rings
Z=n1n2Z ' Z=n1Z Z=n2Z (4.30)
given by
xmodn1n2 $ (xmodn1; xmodn2)): (4.31)
In this way we have a bijection between triples (this holds also for primitive triples) in
Z=n1n2Z and pairs of triples, one in Z=n1Z and the other in Z=n2Z.
Moreover
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y2z = x3 + Axz2 +Bz3(modn1n2),
8>><>>:
y2z = x3 + Axz2 +Bz3(modn1)
y2z = x3 + Axz2 +Bz3(modn2)
The bijection  : E(Z=n1n2Z) ! E(Z=n1Z)  E(Z=n2Z) can be easily shown to be an
homomorphism. Let P1; P2 2 E(Z=n1n2Z) and P3 = P1 + P2. If all the computation are
reduced modni (for i = 1; 2) we have the same result modni : the point P3modni =
P1modni + P2modni.
The previous theorem, implicitly, gives also a method to construct an elliptic curve E
over a ring Z=n1n2Z starting from two curves E 0(Z=n1Z) and E 00(Zn2) through the Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
4.3 Building elliptic curves with a given number of points
Suppose we want to build an elliptic curve over a eld Fp with a given number of points
N = p+1  t. The Hasse Theorem states that the integer N belong to the so called Hasse
interval
Hp = [p+ 1  2pp; p+ 1 + 2pp]: (4.32)
If the order of the curve is not N = p + 1 (in that case any supersingular elliptic curve
over Fp is good) or if no curve on Fp with j-invariant 0 or 1728 has order N , we can simply
try to build random curves starting from their j-invariant and then check if a point on them
has order p + 1  t. An elliptic curve E over a eld Fp with j-invariant j(E) can be built
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from equation
E : y2 = x3 +
3j(E)
1728  j(E)x+
2j(E)
1728  j(E) (4.33)
If the point on a curve E has order p+1  t then we've found the curve, if the point has
order p+ 1 + t then the quadratic twist of the curve E will have order p+ 1  t.
This method, even if is quite simple, is not really ecient. A more ecient method,
due to Atkin and Morain [2], rely on the theory of complex multiplication. The theory of
complex multiplication to build elliptic curves with a given number of points involves deep
arguments of analytic number theory. In the following we will describe only the steps that
must be performed, referring the reader to [2],[33],[13] and [39] for the underlying theory.
If we are working on a prime eld Fp and want a curve with N = p + 1   t points the
rst step is to write 4p = t2   Dv2. Since we know both p and t we can compute the the
value  =  Dv2 and from  we can build the associated Hilbert Polynomial H(x).
An alternative approach that can save some computation when  has a large square factor,
consists into considering the fundamental discriminant of the eld Q(
p D) where  D is
the square free factor of . The root of this Hilbert Polynomial is the j-invariant of a curve
E(Fp). Since a curve and its quadratic twist have the same j-invariant we have only to check
(as said before) if the order is p+ 1  t or p+ 1+ t and eventally perform a quadratic twist
of the curve.
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4.4 Amicable pairs and aliquot cycles
The classical denition of aliquot cycle in number theory is a list of integers (n1; n2; :::; nl)
such that
~(n1) = n2; ~(n2) = n3; : : : ; ~(nl 1) = nl; ~(nl) = n1 (4.34)
where ~(n) = (n)   n is the sum of the proper divisors of n. An aliquot cycle of
lenght one is called perfect number, and an aliquot cycle of lenght two is called amicable
pair. Similarly for elliptic curves it can be dened the notion of aliquot cycle:
] ~Ep1(Fp1) = p2; ] ~Ep2(Fp2) = p3; : : : ; ] ~Epl 1(Fpl 1) = pl; ] ~Epl(Fpl) = p1 (4.35)
where pk are primes and ] ~Epk(Fpk) is the cardinality of the group dened by the elliptic
curve E reduced modulo pk.
For elliptic curves, an aliquot cycle of lenght 2 is still called amicable pair like in the
classical case while for aliquot cycles of lenght one is used the name of anomalous prime
(and anomalous elliptic curve, like already dened previously).
In [36] it is shown that exist elliptic curves with arbitrary long aliquot cycles. Here we
are interested particularly into amicable pairs. Since the group orders of an elliptic curve
over a prime eld Fp are restricted to the Hasse interval Hp = [p + 1   2pp; p + 1 + 2pp],
to have an amicable pair, we need two primes such that one belongs to the Hasse interval of
the other and vice versa.
Lemma 4.4.1. Let p and q primes dierent from 2 and 3 and p 6= q. If q belongs to the
Hasse interval of p, then p belongs to the Hasse interval of q.
4.4. AMICABLE PAIRS AND ALIQUOT CYCLES 74
Proof. If q is the order of ~Ep(Fp) then it belongs to the Hasse interval Hp:
p+ 1  2pp  q = p+ 1  t  p+ 1 + 2pp (4.36)
If p (p = q   1 + t from the previous equation) is in the Hasse interval of q, then:
q + 1  2pq  p = q   1 + t  q + 1 + 2pq
1  2pq  t  1  1 + 2pq
 2pq  t  2  2pq
jt  2j  2pq
jt  2j  2
p
p+ 1  t
Since q = p + 1   t is supposed to be a prime dierent from p we have that t 6= 0; 1; 2.
Squaring the inequality lead to:
(t  2)2  (2
p
p+ 1  t)2
t2 + 4  4t  4p+ 4  4t
t2  4p
that is always true since, from the equation 4.36, we have that jtj  2pp.
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The existence of an elliptic curves with order t for every t inside the Hasse interval is
guaranteed by the Deuring's theorem. So if we have an elliptic curve E(Fp) with order q
prime, we are sure that (p; q) is an amicable pair.
It can be shown also that a2p 4p = a2q 4q. Infact, if (p; q) is an amicable pair for elliptic
curves we have
q = p+ 1  ap and p = q + 1  aq (4.37)
where ap(resp. aq) is the trace of Frobenius of the curve dened over Fp (resp. Fq). Sub-
tracting the second equation to the rst in 4.37 we have:
q   p = p+ 1  ap   q   1 + aq
ap   2p = aq   2q
(ap   2p)2 = (aq   2q)2
a2p   4p(ap   p) = a2q   4q(aq   q)
if we substitute ap   p = 1  q and aq   q = 1  p (from equation 4.37)
a2p   4p(1  q) = a2q   4q(1  p)
a2p   4p+ 4pq = a2q   4q + 4pq
a2p   4p = a2q   4q:
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4.5 Our work
In cryptography, anomalous elliptic curves over elds are weak since the Smart's attack can
solve an instance of ECDLP over them in linear time. Good candidates are the elliptic curves
over a eld Fp that have a number of points q prime and with p 6= q because the most ecient
algorithm to solve an ECDLP instance over them requires an exponential time. We asked
ourselves if it could be performed a "lifting" of an elliptic curve E 0(Fp) with ]E 0(Fp) = q
to a curve E(Z=pqZ) such that ]E(Z=pqZ) = pq, and once performed this lift if it could be
applied the Smart's algorithm to solve ECDLP. As we've seen in the previous paragraphs, if
we have an elliptic curve E 0(Fp) with cardinality q with p and q primes greater than 3 and
p 6= q it is always possible to build another elliptic curve E 00(Fq) with cardinality q. This
operation, if we apply the "complex multiplication" algorithm requires the resolution of an
Hilbert class polynomial. In [3] is given a tighter bound to the complexity of the analytic
algorithm for the computation of the Hilbert class polynomial HD (with discriminant D)
that is O(jDj(log jDj)3(log log jDj)3). We underline here that the discriminant D could be
really small compared to the eld size. As example we considered the curve secp192k1 of
the document SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters [29] over the nite
eld Fp with (values are in hexadecimal format):
p = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFEE37
= 2192   232   212   28   27   26   23   1
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described by the equation E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b with:
a = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
b = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003
and with order:
q = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8D
In few seconds with SAGE we are able to compute the curve over Fq with p points. This
curve must have:
aq = q + 1  p =
=  146402144145231529258894028969
let's compute the discriminant of the Hilbert class polynomial:
D = (aq)
2   4q =
=  3674819131225572514449326781648645596526050223001970845347
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and its factorization:
factor(D) =  1  3  314  49312  540592  1366252466671812972
Since D has a huge square factor, the Hilbert class polynomial can be solved really fast,
leading to a j-invariant for the curve:
j = 5783708012616087999643491142013477486619602496317566169561
Now we build the curve over Fq with equation y2 = x3+ 3j1728 jx+
2j
1728 j . It can be easily
checked (with SAGE) that this curve doesn't have p points, but performing a quadratic twist
leads to the desired curve with order p and with:
a = 6068357910793510789605581141929989070703987109173272323718
b = 5163801337556440901274678590361129865273727616387121840829
This example shows that in special conditions it could be really easy to build an ami-
cable pair (p; q). Building an elliptic curve E(Z=pqZ) with ]E(Z=pqZ) = pq starting with
an amicable pair (p; q) such that ]E 0(Fp) = q and ]E 00(Fq) = p is trivial through the Chi-
nese Remainder Theorem. The curve E(Z=pqZ) have some interesting properties as group
structure[34]:
E(Z=pqZ) ' Zp  Zq ' E 0(Z=p2Z) ' E 00(Z=q2Z): (4.38)
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An instance of ECDLP Q0 = k0P 0 from E 0(Fp) can be esily moved to E(Z=pqZ) to points
Q;P in a way that preserve the relation Q = k0P if we use the Chinese Remainder Theorem
to build1 Q = C:R:T (Q0; O001) and P = C:R:T (P
0; O001) or we can obtain Q = kP with
k  k0mod p if we build Q = C:R:T (Q0; P 00) and P = C:R:T (P 0; P 00), where P 00 is any point
dierent from the point to innity over E 00(Fq). While it is trivial to map an instance of
ECDLP from E 0(Fp) to E(Z=pqZ), is it much more complicate to operate over the curve
E(Z=pqZ) and even harder to try to apply the attack by Smart. To work on elliptic curves
modulo pq we implemented a complete set of addition laws in SAGE like described in section
4.2. The attack by Smart( since we're not working anymore over a eld with a prime p, but
we're on a ring Z=pqZ) required the implementation of the modular arithmetic of Polyadic
Numbers as described by Bennett in [4].
1O001 is the point to innity of the curve E
00(Fq)
Bibliography
[1] Ali Akhavi and Brigitte Vallée. Average bit-complexity of euclidean algorithms. In
Proceedings ICALP00, Lecture Notes Comp. Science 1853, pages 373387. Springer,
2000.
[2] A. O. L. Atkin and F. Morain. Elliptic curves and primality proving. Math. Comp,
61:2968, 1993.
[3] J. Belding, R. Bröker, A. Enge, and K. Lauter. Computing Hilbert Class Polynomials.
ArXiv e-prints, February 2008.
[4] Albert A. Bennett. The modular theory of polyadic numbers. Annals of Mathematics,
23(1):8390, September 1921.
[5] Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, and Peter Schwabe. On the correct use of the negation
map in the pollard rho method. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2011:3, 2011.
[6] Joppe W. Bos, Marcelo E. Kaihara, Thorsten Kleinjung, Arjen K. Lenstra, and Peter L.
Montgomery. Solving a 112-bit prime elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem on game
consoles using sloppy reduction. IJACT, 2(3):212228, 2012.
80
BIBLIOGRAPHY 81
[7] Joppe W. Bos, Thorsten Kleinjung, and Arjen K. Lenstra. On the use of the negation
map in the pollard rho method. In Guillaume Hanrot, François Morain, and Emmanuel
Thomé, editors, ANTS, volume 6197 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 66
82. Springer, 2010.
[8] W. Bosma. Complete systems of two addition laws for elliptic curves. Journal of Number
Theory, 53:229240, 1995.
[9] Richard P. Brent. Analysis of the binary euclidean algorithm. In Directions and Recent
Results in Algorithms and Complexity, pages 321355. Academic Press, 1976.
[10] T. Acar C. K. Koç and B. S. Kalinski Jr. Analyzing and Comparing Montgomery
multiplication Algorithms. IEEE Micro, 16:2633, 1996.
[11] CERTICOM. Certicom ECC challenge. 1997.
[12] H. Cohen and G. Frey, editors. Handbook of elliptic and hyperelliptic curve cryptography.
CRC Press, 2005.
[13] R. Crandall and C. Pomerance. Prime numbers. A computational perspective. Springer-
Verlag, 2001.
[14] A. Escott. Implementing a parallel Pollard rho attack on ECC. 1998.
[15] H.W.Lenstra. Factoring integers with elliptic curves. The Annals of Mathematics,
126(3):649673, November 1987.
[16] Pierrick Gaudry Iwan M. Duursma and François Morain. Speeding up the discrete
log computation on curves with automorphisms. In Kwok-Yan Lam, Eiji Okamoto,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 82
and Chaoping Xing, editors, ASIACRYPT, volume 1716 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 103121. Springer, 1999.
[17] D. E. Knuth. Art of Computer Programming, Volume 2: Seminumerical Algorithms
(3rd Edition). Addison-Wesley Professional, 1997.
[18] N. Koblitz. A Course in Number Theory and Cryptography. Springer, 1988.
[19] H. Lange and W. Ruppert. Complete system of addition laws on abelian varieties.
Inventiones mathematicae, 79:603610, 1985.
[20] H. Lange and W. Ruppert. Addition laws on elliptic curves in arbitrary charateristics.
Journal of Algebra, 107:106116, 1987.
[21] Charles E. Leiserson, Harald Prokop, and Keith H. Randall. Using de bruijn sequences
to index a 1 in a computer word, 1998.
[22] M. Laporta S. Migliori M.Chinnici, S. Cuomo and A. Pizzirani. Cuda based implemen-
tation of parallelized pollard's rho algorithm for ecdlp. In Proceedings of the FINAL
WORKSHOP OF PROJECTS FUNDED BY "PON RICERCA 2000-2006, AVVISO
1575", pages 97101, 2010.
[23] M. Laporta S. Migliori M.Chinnici, S. Cuomo and A. Pizzirani. Pollard's rho algo-
rithm for ecdlp on graphic cards. In J. Vigo-Aguiar, editor, Proceedins of the 2010
International Conference on Computational and Mathematical Methods in Science and
Engineering, pages 363372, 2010.
[24] NVIDIA Corporation. NVIDIA CUDA C Programming Guide, May 2012.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 83
[25] A. Pizzirani. Il problema del logaritmo discreto sulle curve ellittiche e relazioni con la
crittograa. Tesi di Laurea presso Università degli studi di Napoli "Federico II", 2009.
[26] S. Pohlig and M. Hellman. An improved algorithm for computing logarithms over gf(p)
and its cryptographic signicance (corresp.). IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor., 24(1):106110,
September 2006.
[27] J. M. Pollard. A Monte Carlo method for factorization. 15(3):331334, September 1975.
[28] J. M. Pollard. Monte Carlo methods for index computation mod p. Mathematics of
Computation, 32:918924, 1978.
[29] Certicom Research. SEC 2: Recommended elliptic curve domain parameters. In Stan-
dards for Ecient Cryptography, 2000.
[30] T. Satoh and K. Araki. Fermat quotients and the polynomial time discrete log algorithm
for anomalous elliptic curves. Commentarii Math. Univ. St. Pauli, 1998.
[31] I. A. Semaev. Evaluation of discrete logarithms in a group of p-torsion points of an
elliptic curve in characteristic p. Mathematics of Computation, 1998.
[32] D. Shanks. Class number, a theory of factorization, and genera. In Number Theory
Institute, 1969, volume 20 of Proceedings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics, pages 415
440. 1969.
[33] J. H. Silverman. The arithmetic of elliptic curves, volume 106 of Graduate Texts in
Mathematics. Springer, 1986.
[34] J. H. Silverman. private e-mail communication, 2013.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 84
[35] N. P. Smart. The discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves of trace one. Journal of
Cryptology, 12:193196, 1999.
[36] K. E. Stange and J. H. Silverman. Amicable pairs and aliquot cycles for elliptic curves.
ArXiv e-prints, December 2009.
[37] E. Teske. Speeding up Pollard's rho method for computing discrete logarithms. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, 1423:541554, 1998.
[38] E. Teske. On random walks for Pollard's rho method. Math. Comput., 70(234):809825,
2001.
[39] L. C. Washington. Elliptic Curves: Number Theory and Cryptography. Discrete Math-
ematics and Its Applications. Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2003.
[40] Michael J. Wiener and Robert J. Zuccherato. Faster attacks on elliptic curve cryptosys-
tems. In Selected Areas in Cryptography, LNCS 1556, pages 190200. Springer-Verlag,
1998.
